

Arbeitspapier zur Tagung:

## **Globalisierung als Aufgabe**

### **Handlungsmöglichkeiten und Gestaltungsoptionen der Politik**

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## **Globalization and Security: The Challenge of Collective Action**

Most discussions about the effects of globalization on security focus on threat aspects. Technological evolution and the resulting enhanced interlinkage of the world are seen as sources of new threats to national and international security. I argue that the debate about new threats is essentially a product of realistic reasoning and not very helpful in analyzing the major repercussions of globalization on security. As a process strengthening the sense of global responsibility, globalization has more impact on furthering common values than on creating new threats. Therefore, a constructivist or critical approach is far better suited to grasp the repercussions of globalization on security. I develop my argument in three steps by looking at the shortcomings of the traditional approach, then analyzing the effects of globalization on politics and on security using the framework of constructivist security studies, then finally focusing on what I consider to be the main challenge resulting from globalization: the greater need for collective action stemming from enhanced awareness of global problems under existing conditions of international political fragmentation.

### **"New threats" and pitfalls of realism**

In the field of international security, globalization is most often associated with ecological degradation, refugee flows, international crime, uncontrolled proliferation, and religious fundamentalism.<sup>1</sup> These are depicted as "new threats" which may ultimately lead to "global chaos"<sup>2</sup> or even "global war"<sup>3</sup>.

Although this reasoning widens the security agenda – a process which originated already during the periods of *détente* of the Cold War<sup>4</sup> - its logic sticks to realist thinking, according to which security studies consider the conditions that encourage or discourage organized violence in international affairs and all types of military activities.<sup>5</sup> Obviously few of the "new threats" can be countered by military means – and hardly any of their causes. But it also seems doubtful, if the logic used to deal with military threats suits migration or environmental problems.<sup>6</sup> More important are the political questions about possibilities of organizing collective action around pressing issues without formulating them in terms of a traditional security framework in which technocratic and managerial modes of government are invoked in the absence of more flexible political imagination.<sup>7</sup>

Of little help too are realist assumptions according to which the state is the only subject of international security and anarchy the inalterable condition of international relations, as they explicitly exclude central effects of the process of globalization. The major and probably first global threat, the perspective of a nuclear war, did not challenge the central role of states; on the contrary: the extreme

centralization of nuclear decision-making fitted well with the concept of states acting as unified rational actors, whose strategic value could be quantified and balanced against the risks of a nuclear holocaust.<sup>8</sup> The Cold War also had its own system for prevention or management of violent conflicts, which was composed of mutual nuclear deterrence, regional security alliances, intra-bloc ideologies, and crisis diplomacy.<sup>9</sup>

However, the threats of the era of globalization do not usually affect a country's overall security or territorial integrity. They are diffuse and seldom directed at an entire country, often challenging specific groups and in some cases individuals. Policy coalitions to counter these new threats transcend national boundaries, calling into question the very concept of national security.<sup>10</sup> A security concept based on the principle of national sovereignty and its preservation makes little sense *vis-à-vis* such developments. It only contributes to perpetuating a situation of incongruity between threatened objects and objects to be secured. Also simply replacing the aim of national sovereignty with preservation of other national characteristics such as national identity would only transform the assumption of inter-state anarchy into a "clash of civilization" in which realist convictions take on a new mantle.<sup>11</sup>

An approach which can seize the impact of globalization on international security must grasp the characteristics of globalization. These characteristics lie beyond the scope of realism. Before evaluating the pros and cons of an alternative framework of analysis, I first need to specify further the effects globalization has on politics and security.

### **Globalization's effects on politics and security**

Globalization is typically seen as a process driven by economic and technological forces.<sup>12</sup> But its effects are not limited to these domains. Tendencies towards political globalization result from the need for orientation of international economic actors and the consequences of technical globalization - as best symbolized by the globalized flow of information - on other domains.<sup>13</sup> According to the sociological approach suggested by Anthony Giddens<sup>14</sup>, globalization consists in worldwide intensification of social relations by means of which distant places become connected in a way that events in one place are shaped by those occurring in very distant places and vice versa. To talk about globalization in the field of politics is thus to acknowledge that the latter is no longer primarily defined by national legal or territorial boundaries. Following the reasoning of Anthony McGrew<sup>15</sup> a *stretching* of the political process has occurred to the extent that decisions and actions in one part of the world can have world-wide repercussions. Associated with this is a *deepening* of the political process to the degree that developments even at the local level can have global effects. Finally, this stretching and deepening have been joined by a *broadening* of politics in a sense that the growing array of issues which has surfaced on the international political agenda has been accompanied by emergence of new kinds of actors involved in political decision-making. Thus, globalization implies three distinct phenomena: first, it suggests that many chains of political, economic and social activities are becoming interregional or intercontinental in scope and, secondly, it implies that levels of interaction and interconnectedness have intensified within and between states and societies.<sup>16</sup> The result is a "compression of the world" and an "intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole".<sup>17</sup> And thirdly it reflects a relativization of the importance of states compared to other political actors in the international, supranational, and transnational fields.

While globalization is characterized by the weakening of existing mediating political institutions such as nation states, it strengthens the influence on international affairs of other political actors such as supranational organizations, transnational organizations, and individuals.<sup>18</sup> Globalization directly confronts individuals with global forces; the enhanced interlinkage between all places of the world

provokes a stronger sensitivity to and awareness of distant events. We are already in the presence of a developed international civil society, with strong linkages both at the global level and mediating between global and local actors.<sup>19</sup> Its components are NGOs, networks of human-rights lawyers, citizen assemblies, and national as well as international media operating independently from governments. One may even talk of an emerging international public opinion to which governments in all regions are seen to be accountable.<sup>20</sup> Yet implementation of norms and values produced and represented by this international civil society and emerging public opinion is dependent on governments of individual states.<sup>21</sup>

Unlike economic globalization, political globalization cannot be legitimized through shareholders and benefits. It needs some form of political legitimization. Common social acting calls for a political society or a political community. According to Max Weber, social acting should be based on an affective or traditional subjective sense of "togetherness".<sup>22</sup> According to the "civilization process" of Norbert Elias<sup>23</sup>, creation of a society must be seen as a long-term and unplanned process of changing social as well as individual structures. This transformation consists of an evolution, which leads to a differentiated social control of violence and a corresponding formation of conscience.<sup>24</sup> For Karl W. Deutsch<sup>25</sup>, a security community meant an integrated group of people which attained, within a given territory, a "sense of community" which developed into institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. Hedley Bull wrote that common values presuppose existence of international society. According to him, such a society exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, forms a society in the sense that the states conceive themselves bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions in pursuit of their common interests.<sup>26</sup> A further step ahead would consist in creating a world society or global community which would presuppose further differentiation in transnational actors and their way of acting, although state actors would continue to exist.<sup>27</sup> Thinking of international security, the norms of the Cold War era and their underlying values focused on protecting state sovereignty and preventing destruction of civilization through total war. Following the terminology of Friedrich Kratochwil<sup>28</sup>, there was a lack of "love-objects" located at the supranational or transnational level, arousing deep feelings of attachment and representing "transcendent preferences" of the actors and their respective publics.

Whereas Weber's and Elias' arguments are located at the level of individuals and national societies, Deutsch and Kratochwil primarily think at the level of international relations between states and their societies. A central question about the repercussions of globalization on international security is how it affects links between both levels and what results from it to meet the needs and options for collective action. Central to this discussion are the already mentioned concepts of international society and global or world society. During the Cold War, international society and its norms were seen through the prism of realism: international society was composed of states, and their security interests resulted from a need to survive in an international environment characterized by anarchy. The concepts of global or world society were opposed to international society as they suggested a transgression of international relations' state-centrism and its focus on national interests.<sup>29</sup> From global society's point of view, development of what is called international society is the growth of the institutions and institutional culture of the state system in the direction of greater coherence and consensus. This process is encouraged by the emergence of a global civil society in which members are trying to make the state system responsible in the same way that national civil societies generate pressure to ensure the accountability of nation states. At the core of this process is the concept of global responsibility, be it in the fields of environmental policy, human rights, or democratization. But all reflections on international intervention challenge the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention as central assumptions of international society.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, by reinforcing the emergence of a global society, globalization affects the nature of international society. Criteria for common social acting or society building used by Weber and Elias can also be used to describe conditions to introduce more inclusive values and to organize collective action around pressing issues at the global level. Paraphrasing Kratochwil<sup>31</sup>, this would allow moving from the "negative community" of the Cold War to a "global community" characterized by positive common values and objectives.

Unlike economic globalization, political globalization will for the foreseeable future also remain dependent on nationally defined central actors which are nation states. Malcolm Waters<sup>32</sup> defines globalization as social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and people become increasingly aware that the constraints are receding. According to David Elkins' historical research, this leads to an increasing "non-territoriality" of politics.<sup>33</sup> But, though it lies in the very nature of a "globalized space" that territoriality loses its role as the central organizing premise for actions and interactions<sup>34</sup>, steps towards political globalization have to be approved for the time being by national democratic processes and must therefore demonstrate some added value compared to traditional national norms and policies. Especially in the field of security policy, which under the label of national security<sup>35</sup> used to be seen as the national domain *par excellence*, this process takes time and needs practical successes. Thus, while development of international society in the direction of greater coherence and consensus would need some global institutionalization of political decision making, the legitimacy of state action remains anchored in fragmented worlds. For the time being, democracy will not be conceivable outside the framework of nation states. Hence, due to lack of valuable alternatives, nation states will remain *faute de mieux* the central actors in politics. The result is an internal and external disjuncture between democratic political authority and political practice.<sup>36</sup> Though nation states lose part of their steering capacity<sup>37</sup>, development of further institutionalized modes of negotiation will represent the only valuable strategy to follow.<sup>38</sup> The question is how to bridge the gap between an increasingly global reality of functional linkages and motivations for political action based on particular national interests.

The complexity and challenges of political globalization explain partially at least the time difference between economic and political globalization.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, globalization has also been qualified as a process of non-simultaneous denationalization.<sup>40</sup> Since the 1970s, acceleration of worldwide economic interlinkage has led to a qualitative and quantitative gap between politics and economics in the international system.<sup>41</sup> In respect to international organizations, examples for this characteristic may be found at the global as well as regional level: the Bretton Woods Institutions, as represented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have attained a much higher level of shared principles and operational efficiency than UN peace-keeping operations or human rights policy. The degree of states' compliance is clearly lower and the acceptance of basic standards far more disputed in the political arena than in the economic one. Also at the regional level, integration processes have accomplished much greater progress in the economic field than in the one of foreign and security policy. Most obvious is the case of the European Union (EU) with its high degree of economic cooperation, symbolized by its domestic market, and the still embryonic character of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).<sup>42</sup>

The question is how states will adapt to this new situation: They have lost part of their steering capacity due to increased saliency of non-territorial issues in international relations and emergence of new political actors due to the *broadening* effect of globalization. At the same time, they are confronted with new requests and expectations from their political constituencies due to the *deepening* and *stretching* effects of globalization. The two main questions arising from this constellation concern the *legitimization* problem of political action and the remaining *fragmentation* of global society because international society still is and will for the foreseeable future be constituted mainly by states. To further analyze these questions and their impact on international security I will

first look at an appropriate theoretical framework which, contrary to realism, takes into account the principal effects of globalization.

### **Constructivism as a basis of analysis**

Constructivism is based on two assumptions: that the environment in which states operate is social as well as material, and that this setting can provide states with understanding of their interests.<sup>43</sup> State interests do not arise exogenously but emerge from and are endogenous to states' interaction with their environment. Norms constitute actor identities and interests and do not simply regulate behavior.<sup>44</sup> In regard to security, constructivists' basic claims are that security is not an objective condition, that threats to it are not simply a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of material forces, and that the object of security is neither stable nor unchanging.<sup>45</sup>

Underlying the constructivist security approach is the security concept as defined by Arnold Wolfers<sup>46</sup>, according to which security qualifies the absence of threats to acquired core values. Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to such values and, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. The realist mainstream discourse of the Cold War era did not further reflection on the meaning of security or answer which values were to be protected. To say that states strive to ensure their own survival does not tell one very much.<sup>47</sup> In the era of globalization, realism especially cannot explain the role of non-state actors in the realm of international security.

Instead of looking at the security implications of globalization by adding ill-defined threats to an outdated security concept, such as realism suggests, a constructivist approach looks at the effects of globalization on international security in a very different way: it asks about the consequences of globalization on values judged worthy of protection. Its task is not to construct some objective threat, but rather to understand the process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered, and collectively responded to, as a threat.<sup>48</sup> In a constructivist approach, discourses on threats are to a large measure constitutive of the object to be secured. Identities of states, societies, or individuals are shaped by relationships of affinity or enmity in the social world.<sup>49</sup> Actors constitute their security identity as a product of an acquired practice. Their threat perception is subject to evolution. States may change their threat perceptions by evolutions in their environment and modified practices. New security units, such as transnational groups or supranational organizations, may define their own threats in regard to what they perceive as their core values to be protected. Thus the potential negative consequences of global international phenomena, such as reinforced migration or environmental degradation, do not automatically make them global threats. These must first be perceived as challenges to the respective security units' core values. If several units are concerned, this presupposes existence of shared norms and values. Adequate responses to the perceived threats can be conceived on the basis of these values.

This approach provides researchers with a way of understanding the possibility of changes in security relations among social groups.<sup>50</sup> Important is the relativization of the role of nation states compared to other political actors at the global, regional, and subnational levels, such as implied by notions of *deepening* and *broadening* linked to the phenomenon of globalization. Within the framework of constructivist security studies, the so-called "Copenhagen School" sees the distinction between state and society as a crucial starting point for restructuring security studies.<sup>51</sup> It argues that security studies need to adopt an understanding of the "duality" of security: a combination of *state security* concerned with sovereignty and *societal security* concerned with identity. Societal security concerns situations in which societies perceive a threat in identity terms.<sup>52</sup> Societal security takes into account the origins, structures, and dynamics of collective identity formation and the connection between identities and interests.<sup>53</sup> The definition of societal security does not link it to the nation – only to

identity based communities.<sup>54</sup> In today's Europe, these are mostly states and ethnic minorities. At least for democratic states it can be assumed that societal security provides the legitimacy basis for state security. But as the process of integration and globalization proceeds, the sphere of societies' political and security identification might expand to a regional and eventually even a global level. The nation state ceases to be the only political reference object of societal security. National security identities progressively include norms and values of regional and global order. The rising functional worldwide interlinkage, which forms the core of the globalization process, promotes creation of common values and norms among states and societies. It was not realistic to expect relationships between individuals, corporations, and states to be increasingly organized within an elaborate, global framework, while ethical norms would remain a purely national concern.<sup>55</sup>

According to the premises of globalization, it can be assumed that the importance of state security is bound to decrease. With the general increase in "collective power"<sup>56</sup>, global and regional institutions as well as transnational groups will become stronger points of political identification for societal security. However, states will remain the principal actors in the field of international security. Their objectives will be to maintain their sovereignty but also to legitimize their policy. Issues of global responsibility linked to international intervention will undoubtedly gain in importance.

Many questions arise out of this perspective: What will be the consequences of the parallel existence of an increasingly globalized or regionalized societal security as compared to a territorially defined state security? How will increased awareness of global problems, a sense of global responsibility, and the need for collective action resulting from it cope with nationally confined security policies due to political fragmentation? How far can security policies implemented mainly at the national level provide legitimacy for regional or global policies which result out of the *stretching* and *deepening* effects linked to globalization? Will new institutions be created or new forms of government be implemented? Of central importance to these questions are issues of international governance, of collective forms of security cooperation, and of emerging security identities at the regional level.

## Legitimization and Fragmentation

### *Global governance*

Global governance must not be equated to global government. "Global public policy" or "governance without government" uncouples governance from the nation-state and government.<sup>57</sup> It precisely means the search for multilateral institutions and regulation mechanisms which promise solutions for global problems. Cooperation is based on shared norms and values which provide the foundation for collective action. Development of an international community of values, which forms the bases of legitimacy on which common security policy devices would be established, is the most central challenge international security faces in the age of globalization. For the time being, there are global issues which are managed by states within issue-specific frameworks, often on an *ad hoc* basis. But there is still no international society. Just more multilateralism is not enough. More attention should be given to the credibility of norms, their objectives, and their implementation. The current state of global governance resembles at best a cross-national policy patchwork, conspicuous for its missing links and unnecessary overlaps. If global public policy is to provide an alternative to interventionism, governments must ensure that these patchworks evolve into networks of governance based on shared norms and values.<sup>58</sup>

Such norms and values at the international level are based on principles codified in international law as well as ongoing customary practices between states. It seems obvious that such norms cannot be dictated to the world community by certain powerful states. All discussions about a directorate of

"enlightened" states or even a benevolent hegemon such as the United States just miss the point in this regard. Of course, we may follow the thought of Lawrence Freedman<sup>59</sup> that "... the less activist the United States, the less activist many of its allies, and the more local conflicts will be left to regional actors" and see therein "a development that increases the odds that small problems will turn into large ones." But if the aim is further elaboration of international law, as the fundament of civilized international relations, hegemony is the wrong tool to use. International law is not created by hegemonic decisions but by consensus and persuasion.<sup>60</sup> This is all the more true regarding implementation of international norms. If these norms must be enforced, the key to success of such interventions is their legitimacy. Effective intervention must be viewed as a collective international responsibility and not a unilateral task.<sup>61</sup>

### *Collective security vs. collective defense*

In the field of international security, the idea of an institutional framework for legitimate collective action has traditionally been associated with the concept of collective security. With the end of the Cold War, a new debate has emerged about what collective security requires or means. There are two distinct formulations. According to one interpretation, collective security is a regime designed to sustain a particular *status quo*. If implemented, this offers the certainty, backed by legal obligation, that any aggressor would be confronted with collective sanctions. This view of collective security was conceived in the period between world wars and was mainly oriented towards maintaining the territorial *status quo*, meaning the guarantee of state sovereignty. In a second, more flexible interpretation, collective security seeks only to ensure that change is peaceful and that force is used only in self-defense. It is not tightly tied to existing political arrangements or any explicit definition of aggression.<sup>62</sup> This view of collective security is largely based on an institutionalist approach, which highlights the impact of shared definitions of problems, convergent expectations, and organizational constraints on and tools for state behavior. Institutions can thus affect states' willingness to cooperate over the long term, as well as the means they employ, by shaping the way problems are defined.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, collective security is less dependent on detailed institutional agreements than on shared general objectives, such as peaceful resolution of conflicts and abstention from use of military force, except for self-defense, and the principle of common action or reaction. In this sense, a regional organism such as the EU, without explicit security arrangements, can also be qualified as a contribution to collective security.<sup>64</sup>

While the first mentioned approach to collective security is rigid and focuses on state security meaning territorial integrity, the second one contains the possibility of change and is open to identity-anchored societal security. Within the OSCE, the importance of societal security was underlined by establishment of a High Commissioner for National Minorities at the beginning of the 1990s and his numerous observation missions. By contrast, organizations of collective defense have always been defined in regard to state security: their central objective is to guarantee their member states' territorial integrity against third-party states. This clearly differentiates collective security arrangements from those of collective defense.<sup>65</sup> Although constituted by states and for their security, existing collective security arrangements contain objectives aimed at promoting values at the level of sub- or transnational groups as well as at the individual level. The challenge for an organization like NATO will be to declare such objectives, which were traditionally seen as being a part of states' internal sovereignty, as central to its policy.<sup>66</sup> But this would only make sense if NATO were either able to significantly expand the circle of its membership or to use tools such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) to promote its values and norms at a regional level. Should collective defense remain its central objective, the success of such tentatives will be very limited as significant enlargement will not be a likely strategy and non-member states will by definition remain excluded from the organization's core.

### *Regional security*

The stronger the functional interlinkage between national societies, the more political and security effects of globalization are to be expected. The strongest effects of globalization on security are therefore to be looked for in regional economic integration processes. However, the present survey of discourses on identity and security in the EU indicates that Europe is not constituted security-wise as yet another state or nation. The corresponding changes do not occur overnight. Existence of multiple loyalties is at the heart of the debate over European identity. Rising interdependence and consciousness about it changes identities and interests of the involved states and societies.<sup>67</sup> In the field of security, emergence of a specific European idea would legitimize corresponding actions. This would assume that European integration entails a process whereby societal security emerges as a specific field of reflection, separated from state security. Further integration depends on the willingness of societies to handle these perceived security risks by their own cultural security policy and not call the state back in, which would block integration. At this point security, politics, identity, and Europe are self-declared as a project of constructing a security identity. Especially in the military context, Europe, not the individual state, is increasingly seen as the security reference.<sup>68</sup>

There are concrete European foreign- and security-policy reactions, especially in the fields of human rights, non-proliferation, and disarmament. European states have developed a coordination reflex in their foreign and security policy. Even if the result of coordination is often not made public or remains at the verbal level, it is nonetheless relevant in terms of an emerging regional security identity. In case of events occurring within the region itself (such as the political and economic transformation processes in Central and Eastern European countries or the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo), verbal expressions are regularly followed by concrete actions. Corresponding discussions and actions demonstrate the will of the states involved to intervene, even when traditional elements of state security are not at stake. At the same time, the hesitations, ambivalency between national and collective objectives, and finally the visible operational helplessness in almost all security-related aspects demonstrates, that there is still a long way to go before establishing a regional security identity.

Thus nation-states are all but helpless in fostering condition for common action when combining principles of global governance leading toward legitimate and therefore effective international norms with a modern and flexible view of collective security focusing not so much on institutions and territorial integrity than on shared political objectives and principles of intervention. Thereby, the concept of societal security is of central importance to understand the emergence of new security priorities parallel to the continuing existence of state security objectives, as may be observed in the case of the European integration process. The question which remains to be answered concerns the content of the new global awareness in the realm of security and the resulting strategies.

## **Global responsibility and security**

### *Individual or human security*

Globalization has increased the significance of individuals as objects of international security. International politics is more and more evaluated according to its capacity to provide protection to individuals. This has been shown by international reactions regarding the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and towards the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Upholding international moral standards has become a strategic goal. Globalization does not allow a retreat behind physical or moral borders. We can no longer ignore what happens in far-away countries. However, implementing such a policy requires defining a scale of interest. The following

two examples reflect possible directions and criteria for defining such interests in which the protection and well-being of individuals are central to security concerns:

In his global-humanist approach, Mel Gurtov<sup>69</sup> set what he called the "human interest" above any other interest, be it state, ideological, economic, or bureaucratic. He declared the primacy of certain values such as:

- peace (meaning minimizing violence and institutionalizing nonviolent ways to resolve conflict);
- social and economic justice (movement toward equity in reward and opportunity for all without imposition of arbitrary distinctions);
- political justice (civil liberties guaranteed in law and fact);
- ecological balance (including resource conservation and environmental protection); and
- humane governance (popular participation in and accountability of government).

Based on what she calls "general wisdom", Janna Thompson<sup>70</sup> proposed a set of "cosmopolitan ideals" which should be acceptable to "all reasonable people". They are:

- Peace and security: Individuals and their communities should not be threatened by war, oppression, or other serious harms, and there should be peaceful, mutually acceptable means of settling disputes.
- Self-determination of communities: Without making it a value overriding all other principles, individuals should be able to preserve and maintain communities that are important to their identity and well-being.
- Freedom of individuals: Individuals should be able to make their own life choices and associate with whomever they please.
- Individual well-being: Everyone should have access to material and social resources which enable them to make meaningful choices and enable their communities to flourish.

Thus, global responsibility primarily means concern with protecting core values of individual and minority groups. These values cover a broad range of issues reaching well inside the sphere of national sovereignty. This means that while the territorial state may eventually become redundant, the principles and values that govern democracies will not.<sup>71</sup> The conditions mentioned by Elias, which allow reaching a degree of civilization and peace inside democratic states, today transcend the limits of states. The principle dimensions for civilizing conflict behavior between groups and states do not differ from those inside a society. The dimensions of Senghaas' "civilization hexagon" can be transposed to international relations.<sup>72</sup>

The creation of a world society would be best expressed by what Emmanuel Kant suggested more than 200 years ago as world citizenship. The human rights belonging to it would be protected by corresponding public opinion. This proposal follows the logic of Kant's suggestions on making individual states republics, which he saw as necessary condition for exercise of control by public opinion. Violation of rights in one part of the world should be felt by all. Only by making them a topic of public interests would individual rights really be protected.<sup>73</sup>

The special tribunals established to punish those guilty of war atrocities committed in Rwanda and Burundi as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina are an important step in this direction. A further step was accomplished by the 1998 decision to establish a permanent international criminal court. Also important is the recent creation of a position of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. By respecting such values at the international level, the participating states move progressively from a "negative community", characterized by the state security principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention towards a "global community", which also contains positive values such as protection of basic individual rights.<sup>74</sup>

*Intervention and Prevention*

International strategies designed to protect values at the subnational level are bound to use means of intervention. This represents a breach of the general principle of non-intervention which had governed international relations since emergence of modern states until the end of the Cold War. Necessary for comprehension of this problem is understanding of what must be seen as a threat to peace. The general principle of the "duty to interfere" does not provide a sufficient yardstick to define the degree of involvement.<sup>75</sup> Based on common values, a scale of interest should be defined as the basis for humanitarian interventions. A progressively developing practice would further development of constitutive norms which affect security identities.<sup>76</sup>

Already back in 1992, Senghaas<sup>77</sup> suggested that the international community should feel compelled to intervene on humanitarian grounds if a state or political group follows a policy which would lead among other things to genocide, mass displacement of persons, war, civil war, violation of minority rights, ecological war, or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or proliferation. Many other suggestions and case studies followed.<sup>78</sup> Criteria were developed for modalities, especially of international military intervention.<sup>79</sup> Michael Zürn<sup>80</sup> proposed the objective of a "democratic peace policy" as a basis for legitimizing international intervention. Its premises would be that the sovereign state has lost its role as the moral subject of international relations and should be replaced by human well-being; international normative regulation (*Verregelung*) should lose its reactive character; international organizations should be complemented by parliamentary assemblies, and social representations of interest should be organized in a more transnational way.

Military intervention cannot be the first choice of attaining individual or human security objectives. The reactive character of traditional state security would have to be superseded by a preventive strategy guided by criteria following an emerging regional or global security identity. In general, conflict prevention refers to actions, policies, or institutions to keep emerging internal or interstate disputes in specific vulnerable places and periods from escalating into significant, ongoing violence while simultaneously promoting opportunities and movement wherever possible toward non-violent reconciliation of basic clashing interests. The range of methods might include structural prevention methods such as conditional economic development aid, military reform, elections, membership in a regional trade or security organization, or other programs aimed at modifying conflict's socioeconomic and political environment. Prevention might also include more direct methods such as threat of force, sanctions, "track-two" diplomacy, human rights observers, dispute resolution exercises, and many more. The relevant question is whether states and peoples are learning to handle more of the inevitable human conflicts arising among them through peaceful means rather than through arms or coercion.<sup>81</sup>

At the global level, international preventive activity started formally with the 1992 Agenda for Peace of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.<sup>82</sup> At a regional level, several elements of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy are of a preventive nature, especially regarding conditional economic and political assistance programs. The establishment in 1997 of a Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) under the auspices of the European Commission was a further important step into this direction.<sup>83</sup>

Besides national, intergovernmental, and supranational actors, transnational actors such as NGOs have also played an increasingly active role in both intervention and prevention, whereby four basically different mandates can be categorized: provision of humanitarian relief to people in emergencies, promotion of long-term social and economic development in countries where poverty persists, promulgation and monitoring of basic human rights and pursuit of peace, including promotion of the philosophy and techniques of negotiation, conflict resolution, and non-violence.<sup>84</sup> Manifold

opportunities emerge for governments from these numerous "track-two" actors and initiatives in the international arena. But challenges are also linked to it. Among the most important is the need for national and international coordination.<sup>85</sup> Globalization has enhanced the importance of such non-state actors. The emergence of world society would be characterized by further differentiation of transnational actors which would encourage developing such forms of cooperation and burden sharing.

## Conclusions

I have shown that asking about the effects of globalization on international security involves far more than looking for new threats. The process of reinforced functional interlinkage, which forms the core of globalization, also affects the content of international security and its devices. The rise in global awareness, the intensification of interaction between different political levels, and the relativization of the importance of states are central to understanding new developments in international security.

The main consequences are attempts to harmonize norms and criteria of international intervention and the increased importance of new actors. Globalization has favored the extension of national democratic principles to other countries, subnational groups, and individuals. Implementation and enforcement of such norms and values transcend national boundaries. Strategies for prevention and accepted intervention criteria will be needed for international security to move from guaranteeing negative values (such as traditional state security) to protecting positive values (such as minority rights and individual security). The future of international security consists in elaborating such strategies at the regional and global level. Such strategies will make security more than the absence of insecurity.<sup>86</sup> It might progressively adopt the character of an international civilization process, being active mainly in peace time and actively promoting values constitutive of an emerging international community.

All this does not need creation of a world state. But it confronts national societies with the challenge to redefine their security identities according to the new requirements.<sup>87</sup> The importance of state security defined in terms of sovereignty is diminished as compared to societal security defined in terms of identity: The content of security is progressively less linked to specific states but applied at a global or at least regional level. Due to collective threat perceptions and a developed sense of community, states will have to reinterpret their notion of sovereignty in the field of security as well: Its safeguard will occur through different and mainly collective means. Due to a progressively regionalized and globalized societal security, state security will change its character of mainly defensive and reactive policy. Otherwise a cleavage between state and societal security would occur and diminish political support for the former.

Analyzing the effects of globalization on international security opens the door to innovative and maybe idealistic thinking. It shows that ongoing changes in the international system contain not only many uncertainties and challenges but also the chance for an important qualitative step forward in the field of international security. To grasp such potentials calls for an adequate security concept. Whereas the static approach of realism and its basic assumptions do not allow for a meaningful conceptualization of globalization's impact on international security, constructivism's concentration on change, norms, and values proves much more adequate. Thus globalization's main impact on international security is not production of new threats but its influence on a sense of community, starting at the individual level and producing its strongest effects on societal security. Constructivists have not moved very far yet in exploring systematically how norms connect with agents. They should be able to explain how interests and identities of particular agents, be they states or others, are affected by norms over time.<sup>88</sup> Further conceptual differentiation along the reflection lines suggested

by diagnosing the consequences of globalization on international security might prove helpful in suggesting future research paths in this direction.

We need to systematize the demands of global responsibility in a new concept of roles, rights, and duties of citizens, society, states, the system of states, and international institutions. This must include the increasingly systematic intervention of international society and international institutions in individual states which fail to meet acceptable standards. Legitimizing these actions under conditions of political fragmentation will remain the major challenge to master in the coming decade.

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## Notes

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- <sup>1</sup> Economic considerations interestingly do not occupy an important place. Security threats specific to globalization may be seen in the conflict potential due to further marginalization and impoverishment of certain regions creating an increasingly differentiated "two-track" global economy across the conventional North-South divide (Mihaly Simai, *Globalization, Multilateral Cooperation and the Development Process: The UN Agenda and End-of Century Realities* (Budapest: Institute for World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Working Paper No. 63, 1996), pp. 1-15.
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- <sup>9</sup> Michael S. Lund, "Preventing Violent Conflicts: Progress and Shortfall", in Peter Cross (ed.) *Contributing to Preventive Action. CPN Yearbook 1997/1998* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), p. 35.
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- <sup>18</sup> James N. Rosenau, "Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World", in Archibugi, Held and Köhler, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
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- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

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- <sup>31</sup> Kratochwil, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.
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- <sup>72</sup> Dieter Senghaas, "Die Kultur des Friedens", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. B 43 (1995), p. 7. The "civilization hexagon's" five corner are respectively: the monopoly of violence, the rule of law, interdependence and affect control, democratic participation, social justice and constructive conflict management (Senghaas (1995), *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5).
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- <sup>82</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 11. The term was originally applied by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld at the height of the Cold War to describe UN mediation and peacekeeping efforts. At that time, however, prevention referred to containing conflicts, not necessarily keeping them from arising.
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