

In War as in Peace:

Youth Violence – A Challenge for International Co-operation

**International Conference
14 – 16 November 2007**

In co-operation with
Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), Faculty of Social Sciences
at the University Duisburg-Essen and the sector project education and conflicttransformation
(gtz, Eschborn); sponsored by SDC-Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

**Urban riots in France:
history, patterns and the significance of institutional violence**

**Dr. Carten Keller
Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin**

Urban riots in France: history, patterns and the significance of institutional violence

Carsten Keller (CMB)

In France, urban turmoil within segregated housing estates at the outskirts of cities can be observed since the 1980s. While in the beginning of the 80s and 90s waves of urban turmoil especially in the Lyon and Paris region occurred, the tumult in autumn 2005 was exceptional in strength, duration and in its scale of involved communities all-around France. Typically, the urban violence is triggered by severe encounters between the police and male adolescents with migration background, the main actors of the violence. While street fighting between these groups becomes one element of the turmoil, the violence of the youth is at the same time heavily directed against objects and property.

In the contribution, causes for the regular outburst of violence in France are pointed out. Here, the growing geographical segregation and social disadvantage of youth with migration background are going to be underlined as well as a rising institutional pressure and control, reflected especially by penal action and police surveillance. Through a comparison of disadvantaged neighbourhoods in France and Germany, some other factors for the turmoil in France are extrapolated: the colonial background, the right of citizenship and the intermediate articulation of institutional actors. However, the most important differences point at the institutional or state violence present in the French quarters, which only seems to find a kind of counterpart in the German school system so far.

In the contribution I try to give some answers to the questions posed by the organisers, in *firstly* showing that the urban turmoil and violence within the French banlieues show specific patterns. Typically, the violence is triggered by severe encounters between the police and male youth with migration background and includes street fighting between these groups and violence against objects and property. *Secondly*, I will reflect shortly on the history of urban turmoil since the 1980s and stress the changing articulation between turmoil and politics. In the 1980s there has been quite a strong link between the actors in the large housing estates and especially the socialist party, while during the 90s political matters became less important instead of cultural ones. *Thirdly* I will ask for causes for the regular occurring tumult, and here the rising segregation and disadvantage of the inhabitants of the banlieues as well as rising institutional or state pressure are underlined, reflected particularly by police surveillance and penal action. Through a comparative look to Germany I conclude with the thesis that the social tensions within the disadvantaged neighbourhoods seems to outburst in violence especially if the marginalised groups find an opposer or enemy which represents the state.

1. Patterns of violence

As already indicated, the violence is typically triggered through severe encounters between the police or custodians of order and inhabitants with migration background, mostly male youth. Not only the extraordinary turmoil in 2005 was initiated by these severe encounters, which form often part of a kind of battle or cat-and-mouse game between police and youth, once suddenly leading to severe injury or death (Espaces et Sociétés 2007; Mouvements 2006). The bulk of violence is then performed by male youth and directed against property and objects, especially cars within the

neighbourhood and public buildings, that is schools or community centres or youth clubs. These acts of violence against objects, mostly by setting them in fire, are normally executed during the night, which indicates that the perpetrators try to act unobserved and to avoid encounters with the police. However, also street fighting or violent confrontations between custodians of order and the youth form part of the tumult.

As inquiries on urban violence report and as especially data (amongst others from legal procedures) on the last big tumult in 2005 show, the actors of violence are overwhelmingly male youth – between 14 and 18 – and with migration background (Kokoreff et al. 2006; Cicchelli et al. 2006; Delon/Mucchielli 2006; Lagrange 2006a). They are migrants of the second, third or even fourth generation who do have the French citizenship. The background of migration refers mostly to the Maghreb and especially in 2005 also to black Africa. However, this does not mean that ancestral French youth and female youth do not at all take part in the tumult. In 2005, where not only important regions of migration, the Île-de-France and the outskirts of Lyon, have been touched, it is reported that a substantial amount of youth without migration background formed part in other regions, for example in the former industrial region of Nord-Pas-de Calais. Additionally, and how Fadela Amara, the new secretary of state for urban politics and leader of the banlieue female movement “Ni putes ni soumises”, has stated, a considerable number of about 10 to 15 percent female adolescents should have participated in the turmoil of 2005.

The violence against objects as well as the trouble with the police are in fact escalations of violence which is more less present in everyday life of the housing estates at the outskirts of the French cities. Not only to mention the daily vandalism against cars or within buildings, even to burn cars has become a kind of tradition since the late nineties, with its yearly culmination point at New Year’s Eve. In the turmoil of 2005 about 10.000 cars have been burning, but in the first nine month of 2005 already 28.000 have been set in fire, during 2004 about 20.000 (Morice 2005). Troubles with the police are reported in standardized manner by interviewed youth: they tell of endless and repeated passport controls, aggressive presence and provocations of the police, which sometimes look like RoboCop, sometimes house searches, arrests and so on (Kokoreff et al. 2006; Mohamed/Mucchielli 2006). It has to be noticed that the law-and-order and zero-tolerance policy intensified in the first years of the new millennium, especially under Sarkozy as minister of the Interior (2002/4), where also the police of proximity has been abandoned.

Alain Morice (2005) points out that France has witnessed an acceleration of urban violence since the late 1990s. In fact France witnessed kind of waves of urban turmoils in the beginning both of the 1980s and 1990s more or less centred around the Lyon and Paris region. To mention the most important turmoils: the first has been in Vaulx-en-Velin in 1979, then in 1981 and 1983 in Les Minguettes; then, in the beginning of the 90s, again Vaulx-en-Velin in 1990, Val Fourré in 1991, Dammarie-lès-Lys in 1993. In the end of the nineties again the Île-de-France, 1998 in Toulouse and since 1999 in a rising number of cities France chronicled every year a tumult. One can in fact see the riot in 2005 as for the time being the last element in this chain of acceleration and geographical diffusion. The urban violence in autumn 2005 was exceptional in strength, duration and in its scale of involved communities all-around France. It lasted three weeks, beginning in the north of Paris (Clichy-sous-Bois), touching around 200 communities, while around 10.000 cars have been burned and 255 schools damaged.

2. De-Politisation of turmoils

When looking at the relationship between politics, policies and the urban violence over these almost 30 years of history, a de-politisation of the turmoils and rising gap between actors and politi-

cal institutions can be observed (Masclat 2003; 2008; Lagrange 2006b). The turmoils in the beginning of the 1980s led to a political movement, which had its symbolic banner in the protest march for equality 1983 from Marseille to Paris, the so called movement of the beurs. The movement of the beurs – beurs nicknames the youth with predominantly Arabian migration background – formed its protest in the shadow of rising xenophobia and racism in France and in the name of the central values of the French state “liberty, equality and fraternalism”. They mobilised for equal opportunities in relation to dwellings, employment and society, they explicitly formulated claims, and triggered a surge of association-founding. Among these created associations are those with national significance like SOS-Racisme. The movement of the beurs didn’t fall on deaf ears in the early 80s, on the contrary, in the era of Mitterrand the government enacted measures of integration.

Especially the neighbourhood policy in France, the today called “politique de la ville”, was heavily stimulated by the turmoils in the 80s (Avenel 2004). In 1981 the government initiated a national commission against the ghettoisation and a special subvention of schools in socially difficult neighbourhoods. The birth of the neighbourhood policy, however, has already been in 1973 (groupe “Habitat et vie sociale”, responsible for evaluating methods for the improvement of large housing estates, and in 1977 a programme of renovation of the estates), but has been resolutely extended in 1981. Even though a de-politisation of the urban turmoils after the 1980s can be observed, they used to stimulate subventions for the neighbourhood policy also in the 1990s or in the beginning of the new century. From this point of view, the riots always kept a political dimension. In the 1990s the demands accompanying and following urban tumults get more and more centred around cultural questions and pertaining to identity. The actors of the turbulences increasingly refused cooperation with the socialist party, and claims and measures have been more the foundation of cultural associations within the neighbourhood, while the foundation of political associations got secondary. One can state a kind of isolation from politics during the 1990s, which however also has been a reaction to the experience that leaders of the beur-mouvement have been inducted to the socialist party. Striking is the political isolation finally during the events of 2005. Even though the urban violence seemed to be political, no spokesman has occurred on the scene, while the events occupied the media worldwide for weeks.

The question can be posed if the riots have been solely the escalation of retained violence, experience of daily exclusion and discrimination. Or can the actors of the turmoils look quite cool on the history of urban violence in France and stay silent, without a spokesman, knowing that the state will react in any case and adopt new neighbourhood policies? I cannot really go into this question¹, instead I want to point out main causes for the insurgence.

3. Causes of urban turmoil

The main causes – and I concentrate here on the more recent turmoils – can be seen in the aggravating exclusion in terms of geographical segregation and social marginalisation of the population and the youth living in the banlieues on the one hand (1.) and rising institutional pressure and surveillance on the other (2.).

1. Despite the relative developed neighbourhood policy during the nineties, the segregation and living standard of the inhabitants, especially of youth with migration background, deteriorated in the large housing estates. And it has to be noticed that a huge proportion of the inhabitants in fact are youth and young adults (table 1). As different studies show, the trend of flexibilisation and pre-

¹ The question is going to be addressed in the special issue of the Swiss Journal of Sociology “Protest of youth and urban violence” (edited by Keller/Schultheis 2008). Cf. also Lagrange/Oberti 2006.

carisation of employment hits first and foremost the young generation and among them predominantly those with migration background (Gangl/Müller 2003; Beaud/Pialoux 2003; Économie et Statistique 2005). For example, between 2003 and 2005 the unemployment shrunk for immigrants from non EU-countries in France, while it rose at the same time within the “quartiers sensibles” ZUS (table 3). The problem of segregation and exclusion is a problem which of course does not affect only immigrants and their descendants, but especially people with low education and with (former) worker status. Among them, however, migrants are particularly affected.

Table 1: Indicators for the 750 zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS), France, (%)

	ZUS 1999	Cities with ZUS 1999	ZUS 1990	Cities with ZUS 1990
Persons under 20	31,5	24,6	33,4	26,2
Étrangers	16,5	7,8	18,6	9
Without certificate	33,1	18,7	39,3	26,8
15-24 Years	31,8	21,0	36,7	27,3
Unemployment	25,4	15,3	18,9	11,5
15-24 Years	39,5	27,0	28,5	20,0

Source: Insee 2003

Table 2

Taux de réussite au brevet en 2004-2005

	Collèges en ZUS (en %)	Collèges hors ZUS (en %)
Garçons	63,9	77,6
Filles	72,4	84,1
Écart (en points)	-8,5	-6,5
Ensemble	68,3	80,9

Champ : collèges publics en ZUS, en France métropolitaine et dans les DOM.

Source : ministère de l'Éducation nationale, DEPP.

Table 3

Taux de chômage 2003 et 2005 selon l'origine immigré ou non (en %)

	En ZUS		Partie hors ZUS des Unités urbaines avec ZUS		Unités urbaines sans ZUS et rural	
	2003	2005	2003	2005	2003	2005
Non immigré	18,1	19,7	9,5	9,7	7,8	7,6
Immigré originaire pays de l'UE	14,3*	9,6*	7,2	8,5	7,4	9,4
Immigré originaire pays hors de l'UE	26,8	31,7	24,3	21,5	20,8	18,3
Ensemble	19,7	22,1	10,4	10,5	8,0	7,8

* effectifs trop faibles pour toute interprétation.

Lecture : parmi les actifs d'origine non immigrée résidant en ZUS, 19,7 % étaient au chômage en 2005 et 18,1 % en 2003.

Champ : population âgée de 15 à 59 ans.

Source : enquêtes « Emploi » 2003-2005, Insee.

Table 4

Taux de chômage au sens du BIT selon le sexe, l'âge et le lieu de résidence en 2005 (en %)

	Hommes			Femmes			Ensemble		
	en ZUS	partie hors ZUS des Unités urbaines avec ZUS	Unités urbaines sans ZUS et rural	en ZUS	partie hors ZUS des Unités urbaines avec ZUS	Unités urbaines sans ZUS et rural	en ZUS	partie hors ZUS des Unités urbaines avec ZUS	Unités urbaines sans ZUS et rural
15-24 ans	44,9	22,2	16,5	38,0	23,3	23,2	41,7	22,7	19,2
25-49 ans	19,7	8,8	5,7	21,2	10,8	8,5	20,4	9,7	7,0
50-59 ans	14,8	7,3	5,3	13,3	7,4	6,5	14,1	7,4	5,8
Ensemble	22,1	9,8	6,6	22,0	11,2	9,3	22,1	10,5	7,8

Lecture : parmi les habitants des ZUS, le taux de chômage des hommes actifs âgés de 15 à 24 ans est de 44,9 % en 2005.

Champ : population âgée de 15 à 59 ans.

Source : enquête « Emploi » 2005, Insee.

2. As inquiries from Fabien Jobard (2006) show, penalty for small delicts, prosecution against youth as well as surveillance and presence of the police within the banlieues considerably augmented since the late 1990s. By analysing the names of youth Jobard demonstrated that the enormous increase of court procedures predominantly affect youth with migration background from the Maghreb and black Africa, not to speak about the identity controls and sorts of light harassment by the police during their work. As already mentioned, the conservative government in 2002 introduced a stronger politic of law-and-order and zero-tolerance, reflected in permanent presence of the police, regular controls, safekeeping and the severe punishment of small delicts like fare dodging. It is not by chance by the way that in March of this year, right before the last elections in France, there has been a kind of turmoil in the "gare du nord" in Paris, after a ticket control of black youth. In the big housing estates a kind of daily battle and cat-and-mouse game between the youth and the police is meanwhile established. Interviews after the turmoils in 2005 with youth unanimously showed, that this intricate relationship is at the centre of the issue.

However, when speaking on the rising institutional pressure also the wider context of social and migration policy has to be mentioned (Morice 2005). Like in other European countries, the trend in social policy in France is to demand from people in welfare to integrate themselves actively, while at the same time the flexibilisation of the labour market especially for youth is reinforced and it is getting more difficult to find stable employment. Then, migration politic is getting restrictive, which has a strong effect on the immigrant communities concerning their relationship to relatives and friends in their home-country. Not least the strong participation of youth with families from black Africa in 2005 is a hint that the reinforced restrictive migration policies have been immediately perceived, since immigration form black Africa is among the recent trends in France.

Even though the rising social exclusion and institutional pressure are the main causes for the escalation of violence in the banlieues, there are surely other factors and reasons, which gets particularly clear when the French situation is compared with other countries like Germany. It is too complex to investigate here in a thorough comparison between the French and German disadvantaged quarters, however, the situation in terms of exclusion and segregation is not completely but gradually different (Keller 2007). At the same time, three factors come into mind by this comparison.

First, the colonial background of the French society and migration: It is not by chance that countries with a strong colonial background like France and the United Kingdom or the USA with its history of slavery are among those where conflicts with ethnic minorities lead over and over to turmoils.

Also the youth of the second and third generation, even though never personally involved into colonial conflicts, do keep a memory of this history (Lepoutre/Connodt 2005). In France, youth with Algerian or Moroccan parents have reported that they also fight for their fathers; the old conflict between oppression by military and police forces and the colonised revives in a way. Not by accident, the reminiscence by imposing of the state of emergency in 2005 was the Algerian war. In Germany the migration is characterised much more by economic than political factors than in France.

Second, the republican tradition of *ius soli* in France: As indicated, the youth with migration background overwhelmingly are French citizens, since the citizenship is distributed along territorial principals (even though reforms have been and are on the way). The promise of equality is thereby much stronger formulated than in a country like Germany, where citizenship is allocated after a long process of social integration, if demanded. It was recently, that Germany was officially approved as a society of immigration for the first time. It seems that the gap between being citizen on the paper but socially marginalized contributes to perceived frustration or, in the sense of Runciman, relative deprivation (Tucci 2004).

A *third* difference with Germany should shortly be mentioned, that is the wider gap and weak articulation between civil actors in the neighbourhoods and political institutions of the French state. We heard about this changing articulation already when reflecting on the history of French turmoils since the 1980s. Even though there is a rich network of associations in some of the disadvantaged neighbourhoods in France, their link to the central state is less developed as in Germany, as Loch (1998) has early shown. But it has also been an experience of the riots in 2005 that in regions with a dense network of associations in the banlieues like Marseille, no violence has occurred.

4. Conclusion

When we made an investigation into the social development and milieus of the large housing estates in East Germany one of our main observations has been that within these formerly respectable worker milieus a symbolic battle of status emerged (Keller 2005). The social degradation of the estates after the wall came down triggered mutual symbolic demarcations and stigmatisation among the inhabitants, following the principle that the stigma of the neighbourhood is always forwarded to other streets and to other inhabitants – “but not for me”. Nobody really identified him or herself with the stigma but handed it over to socially weaker groups, like the welfare recipients, the drinkers, or the foreigners. In fact the thesis here is that the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, where predominantly a former worker milieu reside, have become a focus of mutual symbolic demarcation and distinction within the lower classes.

While Bourdieu (1979) in his famous “La Distinction” formulated that the lower classes do not participate in the symbolic class struggles of the society after the Second World War, but only the middle and upper class, it has to be stated that the dynamic of precarisation and exclusion since the 1970s has triggered symbolic fighting and demarcation among the lower classes. These symbolic struggles – including a contested ranking of symbolic status where at the bottom stand the foreigners – have its centre in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The potential of conflict within these estates is, in other words, high. But in Germany these conflicts are still performed and expressed mutually among the inhabitants, and there is no strong conflict with an instance representing the outside and the institutional pressure like the police in the French banlieues (Keller 2007). If the rising state and institutional pressure of the actual welfare, migration and control policy is among the main causes for the outburst of conflicts and frustration into harsh violence, it is an

important observation that Germany has witnessed quite a series of violence in schools over the last years. Here, the social segregation and marginalisation of the socially weak comes together with an institution which clearly represents the principle of the state, including the teachers.

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Drug crime in Rio, racist offences against immigrants, shootings at schools, harassment in Belfast's neighbourhoods, killing brothers and sisters in Ramallah, kids traumatized by war in Bosnia or in the Congo – the involvement of children and adolescents in political and criminal acts of violence in mega-cities, as well as in (post-)conflict zones of recent wars, is an increasingly disturbing phenomenon.

What do we know about the reasons and root causes of youth violence stemming from such a variety of political and cultural backgrounds and contexts? What do (post) war constellations have in common with the urbanized reality of western democracies? Do social exclusion, poverty, the absence of education, and the availability of small arms create contexts which enhance violence and may be considered as „grey zones“ between war and peace? How would we differentiate between politically motivated, socially, ethnically or religiously based, and other ritualized forms of violence? Which patterns of violence are specifically youth related?

The conference will look at recent results and findings of international research on youth violence. In order to better understand the driving forces behind, and to identify political strategies to deal with this critical development, we will try to compare and contrast (post) war and non-war constellations, and the causes or patterns of youth violence they present. What are promising approaches on communal and state levels, amongst civil society actors and those in the field of international co-operation, to tackle the challenge of youth violence?

You are cordially invited to participate in the discussions of this conference.

Dr. Corinna Hauswedell, Academy Loccum

Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach, Institute for Development and Peace (INEF)

Andrea Grimm, Academy Loccum

Dr. Fritz Erich Anhelm, Academy Director

Conference Fees/Registration:

Room and meals: € 180,--.

For students (age 30 or under), members of the armed services and alternative service as well as unemployed with proper identification: € 90,--. Conference fees are to be paid in cash at the time of registration.

We request that you register by name, address, institution/ organization at:

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Karin Hahn
D-31545 Rehburg-Loccum,
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E-mail: Karin.Hahn@evlka.de

Registrations will be confirmed as long as places are available. Should you have to cancel your registration, please inform us as soon as possible.

Accommodation and meals:

Participants will be accommodated in single rooms or double rooms, if preferred. All meals are served at the Academy. By prior arrangement, rooms and meals may be available before and after the conference.

Directions:

Loccum is located 50 kilometers west of Hanover in Lower Saxony. The nearest airport is in Langenhagen airport near Hanover. The nearest train stations are Wunstorf, Minden and Nienburg. Detailed instructions will be sent to all registered participants.

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HOUSE SCHEDULE:

8.30 MORNING PRAYER, 8.45 BREAKFAST

12.30 LUNCH, 15.30 COFFEE/TEA,

18.30 DINER.

Opportunity to visit Loccum Monastery, Thursday 13:30 Uhr

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LOCCUM

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and the sector project
education and conflict transformation



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■ Wednesday, November 14, 2007

- 15:30 Coffee/ Tea with cake
- 16:00 Welcome and introduction
Dr. Corinna Hauswedell, Loccum
- 16:15 **Youth violence in the globalized world**
- Introductions to the conference theme
- 18:30 **Context matters: violence in (post)war and non-war societies**
Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach, INEF, Duisburg
- Demographic data and findings concerning the social situation of youth in countries undergoing (post-)conflict and crisis-like situations of radical change**
Dr. Rüdiger Blumör, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Eschborn
Steffen Kröhnert, Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung
Facilitator: *Dr. Corinna Hauswedell*
- 19:30 **Current state and perspectives of international research on youth violence**
-
21:00 *Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Institute for Interdisciplinary Conflict and Violence Research, Bielefeld University*

■ Thursday, November 15, 2007

- 09:30 **Causes and contexts of youth violence – stocktaking** (work in two parallel sections)

SECTION I: Non-war constellations: urbanization, social change and exclusion

A world of gangs

Prof. Dr. John Hagedorn, University of Illinois, Chicago

Youth at risk programming – A crucial element to build citizenship

Clarissa Huguet, Children in Organized Armed Violence (COAV), Rio de Janeiro

Nigeria: Youth violence and the challenges in the age of globalisation

Dr. Nick Idoko, Centre for Peace in Africa, Lagos, Nigeria

Urban riots in France: History, patterns and the significance of institutional violence

Dr. Carsten Keller, Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin

Facilitator: *Dr. Rose Ngomba-Roth, Göttingen*
Rapporteur: *Dr. Peter Lock, Hamburg*

SECTION II: Post-war and continuous conflict constellations: ethnicity and identity, terrorism, religion

Israel-Palestine

Stephan Clauss, Akademie für Konflikttransformation, Bonn

Northern Ireland

Dr. Neil Jarman, Institute for Conflict Research, Belfast

West Africa

Prof. Dr. Paul Richards, Wageningen University, Netherlands

Afghanistan

Martin Hayes, Child Protection Specialist of the Christian Children's Fund (CCF), Richmond/Virginia

Facilitator: *Dr. Corinna Hauswedell*
Rapporteur: *Prof. em. Dr. Peter Waldmann, Augsburg University*

- 16:00 **Strategies for dealing with youth violence and its causes**

18:30 (work continued in two parallel sections)

SECTION I: Non-war constellations: urbanization, social change and exclusion

Juveniles as target group and partner in development co-operation

Günter Sohr, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Berlin

Comprehensive public health strategies

Dr. Alberto Concha-Eastman, Regional Advisor, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Washington D.C.

Intercultural youth exchange: opportunities for young people to prevent and de-learn violence and experience alternatives (beams of hope)

Christa-Berta Kimmich, European play work association (e.p.a.), Hamburg

Neglect and trauma amongst young people in London – how to prevent and work with it at street level

Daniel Baltzer, Kids Company, London

Facilitator: *Erich Marks, Geschäftsführer, Deutscher Präventionstag, Hannover*
Rapporteur: *Andrea Grimm*

SECTION II: Post-war and continuous conflict constellations: ethnicity and identity, terrorism, religion

Linking development and peacebuilding: experiences from Bosnia

Dr. Martina Fischer, Berghof Centre for Conflict Research, Berlin

Strategies for working with youth in the immediate post-accord period

Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, Butler University, Indianapolis

Demobilization and reintegration of children and adolescents – experience from the Congo

Achim Koch, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Eschborn

Strategies to confront youth violence – experiences from Nicaragua and Central America

José Luis Rocha, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), Managua

Facilitator: *Prof. em. Dr. Franz Nuscheler, INEF, Duisburg*
Rapporteur: *Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach*

- 19:30 **Youth violence in cultural contexts: film and Hip Hop music**

21:00 *Katrin Lock, London*

■ Friday November 16, 2007

- 09:30 **Youth violence as a challenge facing international co-operation**

Final winding-up session, introduced by reports of the section rapporteurs

Ambassador *Friedrich Däuble*, Appointee for Conflict Prevention, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin
Dr. Winrich Kühne, Center for International Peace Missions (ZIF), Berlin

Nadine Lyamouri-Bajja, European Youth Centre, Council of Europe, Strasbourg

Facilitator: *Dr. Corinna Hauswedell*

- 12:30 Conference ends with lunch
12:50 Departure of shuttle bus to Wunstorf train station (arrival around 13:30 hours)

Conference languages: German and English;
simultaneous translation available