

**Nigeria: Too Rich for Dignity and the Law?
Perspectives after the 2007 elections**

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Federalism, Governance and Security in Nigeria

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A. INTRODUCTION

Is Nigeria too rich for Dignity and the Law? It is even debatable that Nigeria is rich, not to mention being too rich to value dignity and law. Being *rich* connotes having wealth, possession, natural resources or things of value in abundance. *Dignity*, for our purposes, implies “nobility of manner or style”, honour and some degree of excellence. For us, *the Law* refers to the *rule of law*. Is Nigeria too wealthy to value the dignity of her individuals and groups, and to seek honour in the comity of nations? Is Nigeria too wealthy to operate according to the rule of law? Our answer is NO!

Yes, Nigeria is blessed with plenty of natural resources, which she has not been yet able to transform into wealth for its citizens. In addition, there is no unidimensional and causal relationship between being rich and operating without honour and the rule of law.

Our concern in this paper is to have a brief overview of the relationship between *federalism, governance and security*. What is federalism? Why did Nigeria adopt federalism as a technique of managing conflicts? To what extent does governance (especially democratic governance) provide for the achievement of the goals of the state? What are the basic challenges of governance? If we isolate the issue of security from other challenges of governance, to what extent is the security (in its wider dimension) a major challenge of state-building in Nigeria?

In order to attempt answers to these questions we suggest that:

1. internal and external factors goaded Nigeria to the adoption of federalism as a technique for managing inter-group conflicts;
2. federalism is, and shall remain for a long time, a relevant and conducive grid for managing conflicts among Nigerians;
3. the challenges of democratic governance are enormous, and the federal grid provides a conducive medium for dealing with these;
4. security, as a prime objective of any state, is important in the establishment of peace for democratic governance; and
5. Nigeria is not too rich for dignity and the law, even though its leaders need to demonstrate greater concern for the dignity of Nigeria and Nigerians, for Nigeria must **earn** its dignity in the comity of nations and respect the rule of law.

Let us now turn to our first suggestion.

B. FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA

1. The Evolution of Nigerian Federalism

Our first suggestion is that internal and external factors account for Nigerias’ adoption of federalism as a technique for managing conflicts. Federalism is a mechanism for managing conflicts in a heterogeneous or multinational state. It is essentially, a compromise solution in a multinational state between two types of self-determination—the determination provided by a national government which guarantees security for all in the nation-state, on one hand, and the self-determination of component groups to retain their individual identities, on the other. Federalism emanates from the desire of people to form a federal union without necessarily losing their identity.¹ Thus, federalism is an attempt to reflect the diverse political, social, cultural and economic interests within the broader framework of unity. It therefore attempts to satisfy “the need for cooperation in some things coupled with the right to separate action in others. Only federalism fulfills the desire for unity where it coexists with a determination not to smother local identity and local power”.²

Federalism emphasizes non-centralization of powers. Each component unit of federal system has its powers and functions delineated and guaranteed in a constitutional document. As the doyen

of federalism, K.C. Wheare wrote, federalism is "the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent".³

There is greater inter-dependence among component federal units and less autonomy for subnational units than Wheare had anticipated; but he was correct to emphasize that the division of powers should be such that "whoever has the residue, neither general nor regional government is not subordinate to the other".⁴ In essence, federalism combines *shared rule* with *self-rule*⁵. While powers are shared among component units of the federation, the system provides *self-rule* for component units. Over the years, developments in all federations have shown that it is necessary to establish intergovernmental relations in areas of mutual interests among components units. Nigeria has found federalism a conducive mechanism for managing conflicts, as the *Shari'a* crises in Nigeria demonstrated.

The evolution of Nigerian federalism is traceable to political changes it had undergone since 1900⁶. By the 1900, what later came to be known, as Nigeria comprised three colonial territories under the umbrella of British colonialism, but administered separately, receiving orders direct from the metropolis: London. These were the Colony of Lagos and what came to be known as the Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria. In 1906, the Colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of the Southern Nigeria were unified under a single administrator. In 1914, the Colony of Lagos and Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were brought together⁷. In 1939, Nigeria was divided into the Colony of Lagos, the Northern, Eastern and Western Groups of Provinces, with each province having a chief commissioner who was responsible to the governor in Lagos.

It is our contention that the period 1914 to 1946 witnessed the mere *co-existence* of Nigerian groups who hardly knew of one another nor interacted in any substantial way horizontally. Like most colonial authorities, the British administration encouraged vertical relations between the individual communities and their administrators. Close horizontal relations among Nigerian groups would have nailed the colonial coffin earlier than the British would have wished, assuming they had any intentions on leaving. It was the Richards Constitution of 1946, which formalized the division of Nigeria into three regions within a unitary colonial state. If the year 1914 marked the birth of colonial Nigeria, 1946 was the beginning of effective horizontal relations among Nigerian groups.

Thus within this period there was no concept of colonial Nigeria as a State. Nor had Britain consciously created Nigeria. Nigeria evolved in the context of British colonial policies in West Africa, in piecemeal fashion. In fact, there was no legislative forum for Nigerians from all parts of the country to meet until 1947, after the Richards Constitution. It is true that Nigerians suffered from *parochial nationalism* based on ignorance of one another in the state.

In 1947, Nigerians began to interact with one another in the Legislative Council. A wave of nationalism was sweeping across the southern part of the country. The aggressiveness with which the Richards Constitution was attacked illustrated the upsurge in the political awareness of the emerging political elites. Among the serious critics was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe operating under the *National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons* (NCNC). Dr. Azikiwe's NCNC had criticized the imposition of the constitution without due consultation with the Nigeria people. The NCNC also opposed the role given to the Chiefs and the number of regional units. Actually, in 1943, Dr. Azikiwe had recommended the creation of eight political units in Nigeria within the framework of federalism⁸.

Chief Awolowo, bitterly criticizing the 1946 constitution, called for a federation to allow the various groups too develop at their own pace, and opposed the unitary elements in the constitution, which, according to him, did not reflect Nigeria's multi-ethnicity. In 1947, Chief Awolowo suggested the division of Nigeria into ten units, along ethnic and linguistic lines⁹.

It had become evident that the colonial administration would soon go in response to a combination of international and national events. This realization came as Nigerians had begun to establish contacts with one another. No sooner had they started to interact than they realized that they were strange bedfellows in the same polity. They had not interacted long enough with one another to work out an acceptable mechanism of conflict resolution. Given the competitive setting in which they found themselves, Nigerian politicians withdrew into their ethno-regional or geo-ethnic

cocoons in order to mobilize their followers effectively for competition. The new parochialism was not the old one (based on ignorance of one another) but *parochialism based on the awareness of others* in a competitive setting. As Mallam Aminu Kano told this writer in an interview,

*I think regional grouping was a result of sudden awakening. I think there was a period of sudden awakening in Nigeria, but the awakening was misdirected... the sudden realization of 'we can take power' resulted in ethnic grouping and therefore regionalism*¹⁰

If the very process of decolonization had spurred regionalism, regionalism also determined the form of government Nigeria was to have – one based on the mutual fears and suspicions among Nigerian groups.

*Whereas in most of the other new states the final phase of the pursuit of independence saw a progressive unification of diverse elements into an intensely solitary opposition to the colonial rule, open dissidence emerging only after the waning of revolutionary comradeship in Nigeria, tension between the various primordial groups increased in the last decade of dependency.*¹¹

The sense of distrust among Nigerian leaders and the prevalence of centrifugal forces in the country were amply demonstrated at the constitutional conferences between 1951 and 1958. If the MacPherson Constitution of 1951 had initiated the gradual political decentralization of the colonial central government, the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 confirmed the direction of constitutional reforms in favour of federalism. Regional legislatures had not only sprung up, the central marketing boards had been decentralized. Regional governments became effectively established with Nigerianized executives and legislatures. Political parties that had followed the regional pattern had also grafted themselves in regional governments. By 1957, a central government under the leadership of Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister had emerged. Regional leaders operated a federal constitution in the context of the Westminster model of government. The 1960 Independence Constitution only ratified what had started in the 1940s – Nigeria as a federation.

Our argument is that the pattern of colonial administration had encouraged the emergence of federal government in Nigeria. Even though the British (with a unitary government at home) are noted for including federalism in their political will to their new states, we argue that federalism emerged as a political compromise formula to assuage the fears and suspicions of domination among Nigeria's heterogeneous population. The social forces at work in Nigeria forced Nigerians to accept federalism as a form of government. Thus, the foundations of Nigerian federalism are to be found in the pattern of colonial administration and in the responses of Nigerians themselves as they opted for federalism as compromise formula in inter-group relations. The Constitution of 1960 was therefore a response to the challenges of federalism emanating from Nigeria's complexity.

While it may not be useful to beat the colonial dead horse any longer for the ailments of Nigeria, it may be argued that ambivalent integration under colonial rule was partially responsible for generating fears and suspicions among Nigerians at the terminal period of dependency. After the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, the colonial authorities made no effort to encourage horizontal interactions among the various groups. As mentioned earlier such encouragement would have heralded the good riddance of the colonial masters from the scene as groups developed mutual confidence and an anticolonial psychology. Thus, colonial rule encouraged a vertical relationship between the local administrative units and the colonial centres of power.

The resulting parochial nationalism in the terminal colonial period was born out of mutual fears and suspicions among Nigerian groups. Related to this are two factors, which heightened the fears: the structural imbalance in the federal system, and the differential spread in the pattern of Western education. It was John Stuart Mill who once said that in a federal system, "there should not be any one state so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined".¹²

We suggest that in the First Republic, the lopsided federal structure generated fears and suspicions among groups. The Northern Region was in a position to hold the whole country to ransom, as shown by the following figures: the Northern region had 79% of the country's total area as compared to the Eastern region's 8.3%, the Western region's 8.5% and the Mid-Western region's 4.2%. According to the 1963 census figures, the regions accounted for 53.5%, 22.3%, 18.4% and 4.6% of the total population, respectively. It was not surprising that in the southern part of the country there was always the fear of domination by virtue of the Northern Region's large population – *the tyranny of population* in the context of a democratic polity. The federal structure as it existed made it virtually impossible for the South to control political power at the centre, given the ethnoregional politics of the country.

Similarly, given the Southern headstart in Western education (which had become a passport to occupational roles in the modern sector of the Nigerian political system), the Northern region feared southern domination in the economic and public service sectors of society. The fear of *the tyranny of skills* from the South was fresh in the minds of Northern leaders. The North thus sought to protect its civil service from being swamped by the South. It may be suggested that there was a relative division of functions between the North and the South, which maintained some delicate balance in the political system. The Northern control of political power was counterbalanced by the South's monopoly of economic power in the country.

We may even go further to argue that, contrary to Sklar's contention,¹³ the military coup in January 1966 tilted what had been a delicate balance on which Nigeria had been able to survive since independence. The concentration of both political and economic power in the hands of Southern leaders altered the delicate Nigerian balance. Political power had been the North's safeguard against the South's economic and educational advantages. The South's advantage in the bureaucracy, which if anything was strengthened by the coup, was greatly augmented. The North reacted violently as it saw its last card – the political card – suddenly taken away or rendered ineffective.

These imbalances created problems for the federal system. Centrifugal forces continued to haunt Nigeria's federal balance. Threats of secession by various regions in 1950, 1953 and 1964 climaxed in the abortive secession of Eastern Nigeria in 1967. This was a manifestation of extreme centrifugalism and a challenge to the process of state-building. It took a civil war to return Nigeria to a position of relative balance between centrifugal and centripetal pulls.¹⁴ This balance was, however, not to last for long. During the crises of 1966-67, the civil war, and after the civil war, the military took decisive actions to centralize power and move away from a federal model dominated by centrifugal forces, which nearly destroyed the country.

After May 1967, however, General Gowon, upon creating 12 states took a number of legislative and administrative actions which tilted the federal scale very much in favour of the centre.¹⁵ This centralizing process was facilitated by: 1) the nature of military legislation by Decree; 2) the increase in "Petronaira"; 3) the creation of smaller states; and 4) the civil war, which enabled the Federal Military Government (FMG) to take certain measures which were not easily reversible. By the time General Gowon left office, he had successfully centralized the political system. No state was in a comfortable position to secede any longer.

The Murtala-Obasanjo regime further strengthened the centre at the expense of the States. The takeover of the State television stations is an illustration of this trend in federalism under the military. On a symbolic level, state governments ceased to have coats-of-arms. The Buhari administration did not go further in this centralizing trend. He detained, tried and imprisoned civilian state governors, commissioners and key persons, but allowed state tribunals to carry out detailed investigations of abuses of power in the public services of the various states. It also closely supervised the states thus re-emphasizing the locus of power at the centre. The Babangida administration seemed to prefer autonomous states. However, in creating more subnational units (state and local governments) which like others before them were not economically viable, dependence on the centre only increased. More states depended on their statutory allocation from the Federation Account, on grants from the federal government and loans from the centre, and private financial houses in order

to operate. This trend continued under the Abacha administration. The excessively powerful centre in the Nigerian Federation is largely due to the hierarchical nature of military rule.

The Abacha period was probably the most difficult in the lives of Nigerians. General Abacha showed little interest in governance and often kept away from the office while his subordinates played political lords. Unlike Babangida, Abacha was a bit of a recluse and could not easily break through his security cordon to get the “truth” about situations or feel the actual pulse of the people. He allowed his aides to hold him virtually hostage.

Many of these aides therefore committed many crimes against the Nigerian state, individuals and groups. At times security officers carried out violence against the state to convince General Abacha that the security situation in the country was really bad. As Abacha withdrew into his cocoon at the Aso Rock Presidential Villa, he became more distant from the people, tragically at a point he had wanted to transform himself into civilian President.

Thus, when General Abacha died on June 8, 1998, the country heaved a sigh of relief. His successor, General Abubakar scrapped all the political institutions, which General Abacha had set up and embarked on a new transition programme to civil rule, which ended on May 29, 1999. Nigeria’s former Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo who contested the election under the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) defeated his opponent Chief Olu Falae who contested under the All Peoples Party (APP). Obasanjo was then sworn in as Nigeria’s second Executive President on May 29, 1999.

Thus by May 1999, Nigeria’s federation was typified by a highly centralized centre (following military command structure); popular agitation for a more decentralized structure; dissatisfaction with the distribution of available resources; inter-communal conflicts, and demands by some subnational groups for self-determination.

President Olusegun Obasanjo was very disdainful of the federal arrangement. His style of messianic arrogance and residual militarism did not contribute to the development of a competitively—cooperative federalism. His style exhorted military command structure in which state governors were treated as his prefects. Ironically, many of the state governors treated local government chairmen also as their prefects. Indeed the eight years of Obasanjo regime were years of assaults on the very foundations of federalism—from fiscal relations, local governance, through reckless impeachments or removal of state governors to violations of court orders on crises of federal-state relations (such as the withholding of statutory allocations to the local governments of Lagos State).

2. The 1999 constitution And the Dynamics of Federalism

Under the Obasanjo regime, (1999-2007) there were a number of challenges of federalism. In the relations among **Federal-State- and Local Governments**, there are signs of *residual militarism* in the actions of political executives. The ghost of the military’s politics of control has had difficulty leaving the scene. Federal officials treated state and local government officials with overbearing arrogance. In similar ways, state governors patronizingly related to local government chairmen.

In federal-State interactions, the relations between President Olusegun Obasanjo and state governors oscillated between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’. State Governors were not pleased with the President’s way of operating as if he were still a military President.¹⁶ They accused him of taking actions in flagrant disregard of federally desirable and constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of state governments— especially as provided in the legislative lists. Let us illustrate these concerns with three cases.

The first source of conflict between both tiers of government was the *National Minimum Wage* (NMW). On Labour Day (May 1, 2000) President Obasanjo announced a national minimum wage of ₦5,500 for state governments and ₦7,500 for the federal government.¹⁷ Apparently under pressure from the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), the President did not consult the state governors or the National Assembly. The governors were livid with anger and reminded the President that the era of centralization under military rule was over.¹⁸ They insisted that only the states could negotiate wages with their employees. While recognizing the powers of the federal government to set the

minimum wage, they held that the President could not announce such a wage without due consultations with state governments (as employers of labour) and without sending a bill to the National Assembly.

For almost a year the country was gripped by wage crises¹⁹ and strikes because many state governments could not afford to pay the new wages and arrears as demanded by their labour force. Some analysts believe that the President hastily announced the NMW in order to court the support of the labour force against the National Assembly with which he was having problems. General Obasanjo's military background and unilateral actions goaded him into a number of political hot waters with state governments and many political actors.

In a similar manner, the federal government introduced the *Universal Basic Education* (UBE) programme. This programme is aimed at providing free universal basic education from primary school to the first three years of secondary school. The federal government announced this programme and went ahead to launch it in Sokoto, before a bill was sent to the National Assembly. State governors complained of lack of consultation. They claimed that the matter was under the concurrent legislative list, and that since the federal government was going to depend on states for the implementation of the programme, States should have been adequately consulted.

In addition, some state governments were controlled by political parties different from the one at the federal level. Each political party had its own programme on education. They therefore frowned on the 'military' fashion in which federal programmes were announced in areas of concurrent legislation, without regard to the priorities of states, especially where states were to be the implementing agencies. The state governors and the Vice-President later met to harmonize areas of disagreement over this programme, but many grey areas remained. Adequate political consultations could have reduced tensions in federal-state relations. While, the federal government accused state governments of sabotaging the UBE programme, state governments felt that they could not abandon their programmes in order to execute federal programmes. The federal government had similar problems in getting the cooperation of state governments in the implementation of its *Poverty Alleviation Programme* (PAP), now replaced by the *National Poverty Eradication Programme* (NAPEP). Again the states reminded the federal government that each government had its own poverty eradication programme. If the federal government desired the cooperation of states in the implementation of its programmes, it should carry state governments along. Unlike the German Basic Law, the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 does not provide for states as implementors of federal laws.

There is also the issue of the *Nigeria Police Force* and the maintenance of Law and Order. Given the ineptitude and inefficiency of the Nigeria Police Force in the maintenance of law and order, governors of states with large urban centres and high rates of crimes, found themselves helpless in dealing with crimes. Police is a federal matter, even though the Governor of a State is the Chief Law Officer of the State. As it happened in the Second Republic, many governors complained that State Commissioners of Police ignored orders from them but took orders only from their boss, the Inspector-General of Police.²⁰ In frustration, some state governors demanded for a review of the Constitution to enable the states establish their own police forces. However, some state governors opposed the idea of establishing state police forces and said so. They expressed their reluctance to spend their meagre resources on maintaining state police. These governors opted for a greater level of decentralization of the Nigeria Police Force to enable it respond to problems on the ground more effectively and promptly. In some states, the government officially resorted to using *vigilante* groups to maintain law and order.²¹

The issues of Revenue Allocation and local governments have also been areas of conflict between the federal and state governments. On December 10, 2004 the Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of the Lagos State Government making it clear that the federal government had no power to withhold the funds of state governments which had created additional local councils. Similarly, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government had no role in the operation of local governments. It also held that the federal government could not deduct, as source, from statutory

allocation to states, any debts owed by states. Each component unit was expected to repay its loans. The courts were inundated with many cases in federal-state relations.

Nor had the relations between the National and State Assemblies been smooth. In view of the confusion over the actual tenure of Chairmen of Local Governments, State Houses of Assembly had made laws limiting the term of office of these chairmen to two years in some states, and three years in others. In an attempt to sort out the problem, the Senate set up a committee to make recommendations to the National Assembly. The State Houses of Assembly felt that this was an usurpation of the powers given to them under Section 7 of the Constitution that the "Government of every state shall... ensure their existence under a Law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils." They went to court and succeeded in getting the Supreme Court to rule against the federal government.

Similarly, some state governments created or tried to create additional local governments in their states. Bayelsa State, for example, created new Local Government Councils, and deployed the chairmen of the old local governments to new local governments. The Senate of the Federal Republic declared this action a nullity because it violated Section 8(3) of the Constitution, which provided elaborate processes for the creation of new local governments, including a referendum.²² In addition, the Senate argued that unless the list of local governments as contained in the first schedule, Section 3, Part 1, was duly amended, no new local government was legal. The action of the Senate was declared a nullity by the Supreme Court. In case of Lagos State vs. Federal Government, the Supreme Court declared that while state had the power to create local governments, they should send these to National Assembly for constitutional amendments. It is understood that the Presidency stood against any such amendment throughout the Obasanjo regime.

In state-local government relations, there had also been cold wars. Local Governments complained about undue interferences from state governments. As an illustration, the Sokoto State government was taken to court by 15 Local Governments Councils in the State and the court restrained the state government from deducting 3% of its statutory allocation for funding the Sokoto Emirate Council as passed by the State House of Assembly.²³

In addition, local government Chairmen had argued that state governors, especially where the Chairman came from a party different from the Governor's, plot to remove such chairmen by using the audit powers of the state. State governors were also accused of plotting with the State Houses of Assembly to shorten the tenure of three years of elected local government officials in order to put their supporters in office. In some states there have been protests by elected local government officials against attempts by State Houses of Assembly to reduce their term to two years. Thus, in Imo State, the police arrested 11 Local Government Councilors along with 300 others who had gone to the State House of Assembly to protest the reduction of their tenure from three to two years.²⁴ In the case of Bayelsa State where new local governments were created, some Councilors took the Governor and Chairmen of the Local Government Councils to court because they believed that it was 'illegal' to share funds from the Federation Account with new and illegal local governments. Similarly, these chairmen also went to court to protest their deployment to new local governments as a form of illegality and disenfranchisement of the people, being perpetrated by some state governments.²⁵

However, many Governors claimed that a majority of Chairmen and Councilors of Local Governments, only sit down to share money drawn from the Federation Account and hardly embarked on development projects. President Obasanjo had publicly chided the Chairmen over this issue. The Governors were at pains to point out that the Chairmen of Local Governments did not have the powers they had under the 1989 Constitution, and that they should be enlightened on this matter. The Governors were also angry that the Federal Government related directly with Local Government Councils, which operated under them. They argued that the 1999 Constitution, section 162(6) provides for the *State Joint Local Government Account* into which Statutory allocation from federal and state governments accruing to the Local Governments should be deposited. The states were therefore opposed to what they perceived as attempts by the Federal Government to relate directly to local governments under them. They cited the case of the Federal Government aiding the

local government chairmen to buy security vehicles and gadgets for the maintenance of law and order at local level without the knowledge and involvement of state governors, as evidence of federal government's interference in matters under state governments. The state governors are the Chief Security Officers of the state and should be involved in this kind of arrangement.

It does seem that personality clashes and the lack of adequate culture of relations among the component tiers of government, after long periods of military rule, had bedeviled relations among tiers of government. It is hoped that as a new democratic culture of consultations and the rule of law take root in the polity, and as new patterns of inter-governmental relations are established, unnecessary and abrasive conflicts will give way to cooperation and interdependence among tiers of government. It is also hoped that with the exit of Obasanjo, the militarization of the federal process would be drastically eroded or eliminated.

Let us turn briefly to the issue of centralization and decentralization of power in the federation. Federalism presupposes non-centralization of powers among the component units of the federation.²⁶ No one component – federal-state- or (as in the 1999 Constitution) local government, is superior to the other. They all act directly on the people. If there is no superior government, which tier devolves powers to the other? Herein lies the difficulty of devolution of powers in the Nigerian federation, like some others in the world. A review of legislative list is one effective way of dealing with the devolution of powers. It is hoped that the process of constitutional review/amendments will take care of some of these issues.

Given the post-military rule situation and the emergence of a very strong central government, some Nigerians have called for *true federalism*. By *true federalism*, the protagonists of a weak central government refer to a confederation or what they claim to be the classical model of federalism delineated by K.C. Wheare. This is evident in the 1995 *Report of the Constitutional Conference Containing the Resolutions and Recommendations*, Volume II, which recommended 'innovation' to Nigerian federalism thus:

It should be true federalism with clear demarcation of powers and functions among the levels of government. In the exercise of those powers and functions assigned by the Constitution, each level of government should be autonomous.

In essence, the old sense of autonomy of component units in their areas of jurisdiction, have given way to cooperation, interdependence and interaction. That there was a call for a return to a nostalgic classical model of federalism, however, is a reflection of the extent to which centrifugal forces were at work in the Nigerian federation, as groups sought greater autonomy or self-rule at sub-national or state level in order to control their destiny. Paradoxically, the greater the number of states, the less autonomous the content of this self-rule, and the stronger the federal centre.

However, the prospects of a review of the legislative list in favour of subnational units are high. The future is most likely to witness a relatively less strong centre than Nigeria has now. But it is unlikely that Nigerians would revert to the loose federation they had between 1960 and 1965, or even adopt a confederal constitution.²⁸

Basically, the democratic pressures in the Nigerian federation tried to respond to the centrifugal swings of the federal pendulum. It seems unlikely that Nigeria will eventually have a federation with a weak centre in the next decade, unless something dramatic happens. In addition, as political leaders imbibe greater democratic values; as democratic institutions get grafted and embellished by the federal grid, and as a new culture of tolerance and cooperation in intergovernmental relations are imbibed, Nigeria may witness a gradual adjustment in its vertical federal structure in favour of more appropriate power-sharing formulae among the levels of government. For now, centrifugal forces are likely to continue to push for a drastic reduction in the strength of the central government, beginning with the revenue-sharing formula in the federation.

Another important challenge to Nigerian federation is the issue of resource distribution and management.

3. Resource Distribution and Management.

Resource distribution includes both statuses and material resources. In fact, it includes the distribution of all scarce but allocatable resources. The location of government projects as well as the pattern of recruitment into political offices and the public services is also a yardstick for measuring the fairness of leaders in the distribution process in Nigeria.

In order to ensure relative fairness in the appointment of people from various groups into the Federal Public Service, government established the *Federal Character Commission* to monitor the pattern of appointment into all the public services of Federal, State and Local Governments in order to give Nigerians a sense of belonging to the nation. Cries of discrimination and marginalization by groups have not abated since the establishment of this commission. But, at least, there is an office to which complaints can now be addressed for redress.

The 1999 Constitution provides in Section 162 (2) that the *Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission* (RMAFC) has the function of tabling before the National Assembly a draft revenue allocation formula. The National Assembly shall then deliberate on this document, taking into account the principles of "population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as well as population density". The National Assembly should note that the principles of derivation applied on all proceeds from all natural resources would not be less than 13%. Since 1999, State governors had argued that a new allocation formula should be put in place giving the states, at least 40%. In fact, a delegation representing state governors made the same point to the members of the RMAFC. This point was reinforced by the resolution of the Governors' Forum in Abuja in August 2000.

Generally, given the centralization of political power under the military, the centre became a financial titan, as military rulers altered the revenue formula²⁹ as they deemed fit. They did not need to debate the formula at any legislative forum, except at the Armed Forces Ruling Council or the Provisional Ruling Council. There were many calls by Nigerians for the revision of legislative lists and accompanying tax powers in favour of local governments and states. The argument is that the federal centre had too much funds at its disposal, thus encouraging it to engage in policy adventures into areas it should not and into activities reserved for other tiers of government.

On the horizontal level, there have been cries of 'marginalization' by all groups. The oil producing states of Niger-Delta are angry that the dividends of oil produced in their area go to other parts of the country, without adequate concern for their own interests. Basically while oil accounts for over 80% of the country's annual revenue, it has not changed the lives of the Niger-Delta people. While the Constitution provides for 13% revenue (on the principles of derivation) to the oil-producing area, the governors of these states argued that the federal government only agreed to pay these funds to the oil-producing states from January 2000, and failed to do so between May 29 and December 1999. In response, the governors of the South-South Zone decided to demand for 100% control of its resources.

The point is that, as in Canada and Australia, the Revenue Commission should be tasked to carry out two functions, in addition, to its current functions. It should carry out fiscal equalization on a vertical dimension, to ensure that funds are available to all three tiers of government to carry out their functions. Furthermore, its fiscal equalization measures on a horizontal level, should carry out relative equalization among states in order to ensure some political stability.

In response to the complaints of neglect in the Niger-Delta, a new body *the Niger-Delta Development Commission* (NDDC) was established, to replace the old Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). The NDDC was designed to alleviate poverty in the Niger-Delta area and embark on development projects aimed at improving the quality of lives of the average Niger-Delta person.

Similarly, states with solid minerals also complained that in spite of environmental degradation because of mining activities in their areas, they had not been adequately compensated. They therefore called for the establishment of the *Solid Minerals Producing Area Development Commission*

(SOMPADEC). Interestingly, all the states from which hydro-electric power is being generated also called for the establishment of *Hydro Power Producing Areas Development Commission* (HYPPADEC) to compensate them for the consequences of environmental damages caused by the activities associated with the generation of hydro-related energy.

Since the current quarrels are over the nature of distribution and not over the recognition of claims by contending parties, compromises will continue to be found. While the federal government went to court to seek the definition of the on-shore and offshore minerals (or oil) in the context of resource distribution, there were pressures for a political, rather than a legal solution of the matter. This was done when a law was passed merging offshore and on-shore oil proceeds. Since then, however, some Northern states have gone to court to challenge this law.

One disturbing trait in the politics of leadership and resource distribution is the extent to which actions of leaders (military and/or civilian) can be easily ethnicized. It is very easy for a leader's mandate to be ethnicized or geoethnicized by his people, by the way they lay claim to him. It is also easy for a leader to ethnicize his mandate by his policies and actions. Usually, a leader's mandate being ethnicized by his people becomes more dangerous if the leader also ethnicizes his mandate through his official actions in government. The qualities of fairness and justice in a leader cannot be over-emphasized in the process of nation-building in a federal context. Let us now turn to the politics of Nigerian federalism and the challenges of aggressive subnationalism.

4. Aggressive Subnationalism, Democracy and the Politics of Federalism

At the terminal period of transition from military to civil rule in 1998-99, there were signs of resurgence of aggressive subnationalism, which had been suppressed under the regime of General Abacha. After May 29, 1999 when the military handed over power to civilians, latent aggressive subnationalism exploded into violence.

One effect of the over-centralization of power by various military regimes was the emergence of strong centrifugal forces, which felt disadvantaged in the system. Many subnational groups felt that if the Nigerian federation were not as centralized as it was, they would have had a fairer deal in the federation.

Between 1999 and 2007, the suppressed *angst* of various groups with the Nigerian federation found expressions in many ways. The emergence of a fiscally and politically titanic centre had questioned the basic sense of security of groups. Let us illustrate this with some cases.

As a result of the Constitutional Conference of 1994/95, Nigeria was informally divided into 6 geopolitical zones.³⁰ These zones were regarded as development zones and zones for sharing resources among Nigerian groups. The Southwest zone, from the Abacha days had pressed for a *Sovereign National Conference* to discuss the "restructuring" of Nigeria. In essence, it was asking for a return to the old regions with their accompanying autonomy. This demand was partly predicated on the assumption that the federation was too centralized and that those who controlled political power at the centre also controlled resources, including their extraction and distribution. They therefore opted for the old regional autonomy (between 1960 and 1965) in order to control their resources and pace of development.

After May 1999, the *O'dua People's Congress* (OPC) declared its stand for the freedom of Yorubas to go it alone as an independent unit. It declared its desire to protect and defend Yoruba interests anywhere in Nigeria. The first eruption of crises was in Shagamu between OPC-backed group and Hausa settlers. Many people were killed and goods were destroyed. The corpses of Hausa men, which were carried back to Kano, generated a retaliatory wave of violence in that city against Yorubas. In response, Northern youths formed the *Arewa People's Congress* (APC) to challenge OPC violence.

OPC violence at Ketu and other places in Lagos angered the Ibos, who also set up the *Igbo People's Congress* (IPC) to deal with what they considered OPC's unwarranted meddlesomeness and violence. The OPC violence in Lagos got to a point at which the President threatened the Governor of

Lagos State with a declaration of a State of Emergency in the State, unless he could restore law and order. Lagos had become extremely unsafe. Many people saw OPC's espousal of Yoruba nationalism as the reason for OPC leaders who had been declared wanted at a point, being shielded from the police.

If OPC activities were not properly curbed by President Obasanjo, because of the logic of federal autonomy of Yorubas espoused by that group, why should President Obasanjo deal with political manifestations of autonomy in other states? Zamfara State then chose to use *Shari'a* law to declare her federally desirable autonomy. Since May 1999, it was clear that the old North had lost political power, even though it had voted massively for General Obasanjo. The announcement of the introduction of *Supreme Shari'a* in Zamfara State, introduced a new factor in the politics of federalism. Up till then, state governments had operated *Shari'a* law as provided in the Constitutions of 1979, 1989 and 1999— it was applicable only to civil proceedings involving Islamic personal law such as inheritance, divorce and others. The *Supreme Shari'a* expanded the parameters of *Shari'a* Law to include criminal matters. As a result of this *Shari'a* Law, two thieves were amputated in Zamfara State. A seventeen-year-old girl was also flogged eighty times for fornication in the same state. In Kano and Katsina States, a number of people were convicted for consuming alcoholic drinks and were sentenced to varying number of strokes of the cane.

After its introduction in Zamfara State, *Sharia* Law was adopted in ten other northern States.³¹ News of its introduction in Kaduna State (which is multi-ethnic and multi-religious in nature) led to gross communal violence and the death of many Nigerians. The killing of Ibos and others in Kaduna extracted reciprocal killings of Hausa-Fulani Muslims in Abia and Imo States. In fact, the State governors of Abia, Imo, Enugu, Anambra and Ebonyi States (of the Southeastern zone) called for a Confederal Nigeria.³² The governors were quickly backed by the Yoruba *Afenifere* leader, Chief Abraham Adesanya, who argued that there was hardly any difference between "true federation as demanded by Yorubas" and "confederacy which the *Igbos* are now demanding." In his usually blunt style, President Obasanjo described the call for a confederation as "highly mischievous and extremely unpatriotic."³³ Mischievous or not, the demand for confederation by the Southeast zone sent shivers down the political spine of the North which then sent emissaries to the Southeast on reconciliation mission.

Following closely these developments was the announced intention to declare a *Republic of Biafra* by the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of *Biafra* (MASSOB) on May 27, 2000. Disowned by Ojukwu and the pan-Ibo *Ohaneze* group, MASSOB hoisted a *Biafran* flag, while the leader escaped on motorcycle during the so-called ceremony. Was the call for confederation, like the *Shari'a* a political card? If it was, other zones were soon to put their cards on the political table.

As mentioned earlier, the governors of the South-South had complained about the non-release of 13% derivation fund to their states from May 29 to December 31, 1999. From the days of the military rule, the Niger-Delta had always been an area of conflict. Devastated by oil exploration, inadequately touched by the benefits of oil, and overwhelmed by an army of unemployed youth, the area has seen violence aimed at extracting positive responses from the federal government and oil companies.

In fact, oil pipelines had been sabotaged at various times, while communities involved in illegal oil bunkering had suffered tragic consequences resulting from unexpected explosions and inferno. In a demonstration of anger, Bayelsa youths in Odi had captured police officers, ambushed and killed four soldiers. As reaction, government ordered military action, which razed Odi village. It was a wanton military operation, clearly illustrating the need for Nigeria to establish a para-military unit appropriately trained for dealing with civil disobedience.

With this background of restiveness among the youth and their pressures on state governments, what was seen as the refusal of the federal government to release the 13% derivation fund, due to the states from May 29, 1999 to December 1999, soon took another dimension. The Governors of the states in the South-South Zone met and issued a communiqué that they had set the machinery "in motion to assume full control of its resources within the framework of true

federalism.”³⁴ Was this constitutional? Could states control mineral resources, when mining is under the exclusive legislative list of the federation? Again, the reaction by State governors of the South-South zone reflects the level of dissatisfaction among Nigerians with the operation of the federation.

Similarly, the Middle-Belt (or the North Central Zone) reacted to a number of issues in the federation. The trigger for the Middle Belt reactions was the complaint by the core North or Hausa-Fulani that the Service Chiefs of the Armed Forces came from the Middle-Belt and not the North. There were spontaneous reactions to what was regarded as Northern hypocrisy - using the Middle-Belt when it was convenient, to fight its war and turn around to dump them. The Middle-Belt Forum made it clear that it was no longer interested in being part of the old Northern geopolity, or share Northern identity with the Hausa-Fulanis.³⁵ The Middle-Belt supported a federation with a strong centre, with equity of opportunities for all. It called for equity in the distribution of resources and the need to encourage solid minerals, agricultural, and industrial development in the zone. Like the Southeast, Southwest and South-South zones, the Middle-belt or the North-central zone called for a national conference to discuss all outstanding issues in the Nigerian federation.

In essence, the violent protests in the Niger-Delta over perceived injustice in resource distribution; the Itsekiri-Ijaw violence in the Niger-Delta; the resumption of the Ife-Modakeke communal violence; the Odi violence and the sacking of the community by Obasanjo administration; the menace of *Odu'a Peoples' Congress* (OPC) and the accompanying violence in Lagos and Shagamu areas; the formation of the *Arewa Peoples' Congress* (APC) and the *Igbo Peoples' Congress* (IPC); the MASSOB feeble attempt to resuscitate *Biafra*; the *Shari'a* crises and the demands for a confederation; the South-South demand for the control of its resources; were all part of the bubbles of the Nigerian federation.

That these political bubbles worried President Obasanjo was reflected in his address to the members of the Obasanjo Leadership Forum when they paid a courtesy call on him. Obasanjo claimed that the *Shari'a*, OPC and Niger-Delta crises were all programmed to destabilize Nigeria. According to the President, “... some people want to secede. Some people want to break away from Nigeria while others want a stronger federation”.³⁶

President Obasanjo's abrasive and arrogant style of leadership alienated many people, especially in the Niger-Delta. He often equated disagreement with the federal government as a challenge to his ego. It was not surprising that he over-heated the polity frequently.

In spite of the discordant notes in the federation, it is clear that the federal grid has provided a conducive atmosphere for striking desirable compromises over time. As Nigerians continue to find ways of managing their conflicts, it is clear that federalism will continue to provide the appropriate context for nation-building, no matter how tortuous.

C. THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Our third suggestion is that the challenges of democratic governance are enormous and that the federal grid provides a conducive milieu for dealing with these. The challenges of governance in Nigeria, like in other African State, include *state-building* (centralization of Authority) *nation-building* (creating unity in the political community); extraction of resources (economic development); distribution (of scarce but allocatable resources); democratization; rural poverty and urban development; halting the decay of social institutions; leadership and followership; and the pursuit of perceived national interest in the international arena.³⁷ A major goal of government is the pursuit of the welfare of the people. Space constrains our elaborate discussions here.

Governance deals with how those reposed with the authority of the state make efforts to achieve the goals or the ends of the state—the maintenance of law and order; the provision of welfare for its citizens and the pursuit of national interest in the global arena. Governments therefore exist to achieve these ends.

Democracy has some universal principles, which are adaptable to different political environments. These include, the people as the repository of power and legitimators of authority; the *rule of law*; *legitimacy* (the *right to rule* and demonstrable ability to *rule rightly*); *freedom of choice of leaders* and other values (such as freedom of worship, association and thought and expression); and *accountability*.

With a history of authoritarianism, which lasted for almost thirty years, Nigerians had high expectations when a new 'democratic' regime was established in May 1999. What happened to these expectations by May 2007—after two terms of eight years of the Obasanjo regime?

Let us choose a few indicators and very briefly comment on them—democracy, the economy, constitution and constitutionalism, distribution of resources, and leadership.

1. The Challenge of Democracy

a. Politicians

Nigeria has made a transition from military to civil rule. So far, many of our politicians are still learning democratic values. They exhibit 'residual military' psyche in their actions. They do not seem to be ready for democratic practices. These politicians see democracy in instrumental terms and are more concerned with the perquisites that politics provides under a democracy.

This is why Nigeria has three groups of politicians – **politicians-political contractors** and **political touts** – in the political terrain. The **politician** is one who is dedicated to politics and seeks to acquire and use power in the interest of his electorate — for the maintenance of law and order, the provision of welfare, and the pursuit of the interests of the State in relations with other States in the international system. There are very few of these available in Nigeria today; even these have collectively become endangered specie.

The **political contractor** is a businessman in the political terrain. For him, democracy is tolerable nuisance, which provides greater access to resources. The ends of democracy and values are unimportant, even though he may be shouting democratic rhetorics at public fora. The **political tout** is the hiring of the contractor and does his bidding, even if it involves the maximum dispensation of violence. For the tout, democracy means 'democratization of violence' and democratic access to the instruments of violence—and at times these undercut the state's ability to maintain law and order. Violence in most states of the federation, especially during the elections and after, illustrates this point. Anambra and Oyo States illustrate the dangerous dimensions of the activities of political contractors. The Ngige-Ubah and the Ladoja-Adedibu crises are current examples. It is our hope that in the next twenty years, political contractors and touts would have fizzled out of the system in favour of politicians.

b) Political Leadership and Statesmanship

It is clear that since 1999, the political class had not learnt that leadership entails listening to your followers, persuading them when necessary, and providing guidance and foresight. At the federal level, General Obasanjo, as President, exhibited *messianic arrogance* and *residual militarism*. Many chief executives in the states shared the trait of residual militarism with him. These leaders, at all levels, did not learn that once elected, they must transform themselves into statesmen. Nigeria's experience has shown that many of her leaders are still remained politicians – **there is no principle they cannot mortgage, there is no value they cannot adulterate, and there is no law or rule they can not bastardize**. From the election of the Senate President in 1999 through attempts to remove the former Speaker of the House of Representatives (Alhaji Ghali Na'abba) and those of states, the abortive 'coup' in Anambra, to fraudulent actions by leaders in the process of passing electoral act, and the election of Senator Wabara as Senator and President of the Senate, the politics of self-interest, not statesmanship dominated the polity. The political class must wake-up, demonstrate better understanding of the kind of leadership required in a multinational Nigeria,

otherwise they would be committing class suicide. The Presidency had lost its dignity and respect, especially with the 'battle' between President Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku Abubakar. It will be a herculean task for the government and the people to restore the dignity of the Office of the President, and trust between the government and the people.

c) Political Tolerance of the opinion of others and the extension of the democratic space is another challenge. In Nigeria, the actors of the past eight years, seem not to understand democracy or had not learnt from the politicians of the past Republics. There is so much intolerance among politicians, it is amazing and yet disgusting. Intra-party squabbles have led to deaths. How, for example, does one explain the show of force demonstrated by the Nigeria Police in Kano at the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) rally on 23rd of September 2003? What good excuse did the police have for denying ANPP the permit to hold the rally — beyond the usual 'security reasons'? There are excessive abuse of human rights and freedom of association, using the Public Order Act to arrest and intimidate political opponents. How does one explain government's use of force during the Nigeria Labour Congress' (NLC) demonstration against its hike in fuel prize? How can one explain the abuse of court process by the federal government — after having its case against the NLC thrown out in Abuja, taking it to a court of coordinate jurisdiction in Lagos? The Lagos court granted the injunction, which became popularly known by Nigerians as black market, or *bolekaja* injunction. Political leaders must not only be responsive to the yearnings of the people, they must demonstrate a high sense of constitutionalism in their actions. They must tolerate the opposition because this country belongs to all. Nigerians must nurture the democratic plant of freedom with demonstrable understanding and mutual respect for one another. The excessive dependence of Obasanjo regime on coercion was anti-democratic, and even dangerous for the political class.

d) The Electoral Process

While winners called the 2003 elections free and fair, some losers called it fraudulent. On balance, as a political observer, the 2003 elections in many parts of Nigeria were very fraudulent. Politicians put their rigging machines on overdrive and ended with overkill. It was a disastrous exercise — detracting from the democratic learning process and potentially challenging our process of national integration.

The April 2007 elections were even more fraudulent than the 2003 elections. Domestic and international observers confirmed this. The new Yar'adua government is beginning its rule on a bed of crises of legitimacy. Many Nigerians believe that he did not have the "right to rule" because he did not have the peoples' mandate. Can he gradually acquire legitimacy by being sensitive to the peoples' yearnings and "ruling rightly"?

e) Trivialization and bastardization of impeachment provisions

The Nigerian constitution is clear on the procedures for the removal of chief executives. But the gale of impeachment/removal that swept across the country left doubt in the minds of many observers. Five State Governors were removed in very controversial circumstances. The affected governors were those of Bayelsa, Anambra, Oyo, Ekiti and Plateau States. In the Anambra case, the court reversed his electoral fortunes. The entire exercises were more of political melodramas in which constitutional provisions were easily trivialized and bastardized. Impeachment that was meant to be a way of ensuring accountability of elected leaders became a political weapon used by the presidency to eliminate those perceived to be in the opposing camp. The exercises can best be described as forced removal, if not a coup. It is the credit of the Nigerian judiciary that the courts reversed all these illegal removals orchestrated by the Presidency.

All these violations point to the need to revisit the constitution with a view to safeguarding the autonomy of the subnational units and the independence of the judiciary against the might of the federal executive. In addition, it is our hope that these experiences will serve as lessons to Nigeria's

political leaders. They should develop the culture of tolerance and resilience in politics. They should rise above money politics and ephemeral pleasures.

f) Constitutional violations and democratic deficit.

It is true that, years of military rule, in part, contributed to the centralization of the Nigerian federation – a far cry from 1965. Candidly, there is need for the revision of the legislative lists to give state and local governments more functions. In addition, tax powers of each tier of government should be reviewed to reflect new responsibilities so acquired.

Political leaders should be sensitive to constitutional provisions. The Obasanjo administration treated the running of the federation under democracy as if it were under military rule. His late wife, the late first lady, visibly demonstrated such when she sent circulars to wives of governors that she was the only First Lady. This was not a military regime and each governor was elected independent of the President, and were not beholden to him. The constant summoning of the governors to Abuja was only reflective of military rule. The Governors are chief executives of their states, responsible to their electorates, and must therefore be left alone to do their jobs. The use of the National Council of States (NCS) to legitimize government decisions is unconstitutional. Illustrations of these were the announcement made by the Presidency that i) the NCS had approved the 774 Local Government Reforms; ii) NCS had approved the non-inclusion of religion and ethnic group in 2006 census exercise; and iii) the raising of pump prices of oil. NCS is an advisory body to the President. The President should have related more actively with the National Assembly, to give the federation and democracy the proper nudge forward. There are obvious prospects of greater inter-governmental relations, which the large egos of some leaders prevented them from exploiting.

2. The Economy

Nigeria's economy is in a bad shape—the exchange rate is about N130 to one USA dollar; inflation still haunt the common man's hope for a good take home pay; some banks have collapsed; the manufacturing sector has experienced closures; the privatization process appears to be a **personalization** process and there are allegations that a few Nigerians are buying national assets; there seems to be greater **invasion** of Nigeria's market by external forces than investment; Nigeria's infrastructure are dilapidated; her educational system is collapsing and the health sector is severely in pains. With all these, one is tempted to ask whether the gloated **economic reforms** of the federal government are not really causing **economic deforms**? Nigerians are groaning under severe hardship, amidst plenty. These are not evidence of a rich country.

Political leaders must address these issues urgently because they relate to the sustenance of democracy, the federation, and the nation. Nigeria needs to diversify her **monocultural** economy. Her **deregulation** and **privatization** policies must be pursued with all sense of patriotism and sincerity, transparency and accountability.

Democratic culture and stability cannot thrive in a society where there is abject poverty. Nigeria's poverty alleviation/eradication programmes have so far failed to tackle the problem. There is the need to work seriously on these in order to save Nigeria's democracy. With abundant human and natural resources, we strongly believe that Nigeria's poverty is related to the ineptitude and inefficiency in governance in the polity. Nigeria can be rich if her leaders utilize these resources for the benefit of all.

So far, the federal government seems to have so much money that it dabbles into any area of its fancy. Candidly, housing, water, agriculture, primary schools and rural development should revert to state and local governments, which should have enough resources to carry out these functions. With regard to the adequacy of fiscal or tax powers, it is clear that all tiers of government have been complacent about generating needed revenues. The over-dependence on the Federation Account by all governments is not conducive to the fiscal autonomy and accountability of the component governments of the Nigerian federation. One wonders if revising the tax powers would make any

difference if the appropriate authorities do not collect these taxes. Internally generated revenue and accountability are essential parts of federal autonomy.

Nigerian leaders and followers must embark on human development because:

Human development in its fullest sense requires democratic governance – with all people able to participate in institutions and decisions that shape their lives and all those who hold power held accountable for their actions. Achieving human development also depends on peace and personal security.³⁸

3. The Challenge of Distribution of Resources

All federal systems have this problem. Through a process of fiscal equalization, funds are transferred to other states that are less well-to-do without necessarily robbing the rich states of their funds. In Australia, the Australian Lands Grant Commission carries out fiscal equalization among component units of the federation. Canada has a structured system of fiscal equalization.

It is recommended that Nigeria's RMFAC should collate available data and embark on vertical and horizontal fiscal equalization among the component units of the federation. This should be an annual event, which would still take cognizance the Revenue Formula. Fiscal equalization would transfer funds to less well-to-do states for the purpose of national development. At the same time, it retains funds in states from where resources are extracted.

At the National Political Reform Conference (2005), one of the hottest moot-point was the issue of resource distribution. The Niger-Delta had pressed for the control of their resources by 25% but gradually moving up to fifty/sixty percent on the basis of derivation. A number of reactions to this prompted the withdrawal of the South-South delegation from the conference.

Candidly, Nigerians are so concerned with the distribution of resources, they often forget that it is even more important to produce what is to be shared. The argument is like a chicken and egg story, after a point. Some people feel that there is no need to help in the production of resources because those who contributed little gain more. Yet if you do not produce, there is nothing to share. However, as long as you live in the same political community, you need to work out a mechanism for sharing resources through compromise. This is because of the realization that all are equal stakeholders in the process of nation-building.

It does seem that a number of actions need to be taken in the Nigerian federation. These are:

- i. The revision of the legislative list in favour of the states and local governments seem to be a political imperative. Similarly, the *tax powers should be correspondingly reviewed*.
- ii. On the *distribution of oil resources*, it may be suggested that there may be a need to go back to the old dichotomy between *on-shore* and *offshore* oil. Fifty percent of the on-shore oil revenues should go to the states of origin on the basis of derivation principle. However, fifty percent of the offshore oil revenues should go into a *stabilization fund* for fiscal equalization among tiers of government and among non-oil producing states. This should be used to relatively close any gaps between oil and non-oil producing states. Ten percent of the offshore oil revenues should go to the rehabilitation of mining areas (solid minerals and oil). Ten percent of the off-shore oil should go to the social development (education, health, e.t.c.) of the oil mineral producing areas; while the remaining thirty percent off-shore oil revenue goes to the Federation Account for the usual distribution.
- iii. The RMAFC should be tasked with the functions of monitoring and working out formal mechanism for fiscal equalization, vertically and horizontally. This can be periodically reviewed, and should rob the central government of the subjectivity involved in the grants it makes to sub-national units.
- iv. Greater inter-governmental interaction may reduce the problems associated with inter-tier conflicts. Under the Obasanjo administration, states and local governments were

treated as virtual extensions of the federal government. Some of the avoidable conflicts in the federation under the Fourth Republic derive from the hangover of the military regime in which the centre had grown titanic. Curbing the unnecessary adventures of the centre has become a problem. There are many arenas of cooperative inter-governmental relations. Politicians at this stage of Nigeria's development are either ill-equipped to deal with these problems or are unwilling to establish normal inter-governmental relations, even when constitutionally provided.

Like most things in nation states, there is a need for mutual compromise to enable **fairness, justice** and **relative equity** lubricate the wheels of the federation. It is hoped that with more discussions and collective experience, the politics of distribution will not be a danger to the federation.

4. The Challenges of Leadership

Leadership remains a vital factor in effecting the compromises that the federal process necessitates. The way **our political leaders respect the rules of the game politics; their ability to imbibe the democratic values of accommodation, tolerance of opposition and participation; and their ability to demonstrate gallantry in defeat and grace in victory, will determine the extent of harmony in the future.** Reconciliation is a basic component of this process and the leadership must be so inclined. The task of nation-building is complex and the dynamics of reconciliation are infinite. The leadership must therefore build the confidence of its citizens as it strives to balance conflicting claims. In the final analysis, structures and institutions alone cannot build understanding and cooperation in the polity. **The attendant human values of tolerance, fairness, justice and transparent honesty are essential ingredients, which the leadership must imbibe and promote.**

In addition, leadership must be people-centric and development oriented. It must carry the people along and must be sensitive to its needs. So far, Nigeria's history has shown that only very few leaders have this quality. It is hoped that Yar'adua, the new President will imbibe these values, which he had announced at his inauguration. It is our recommendation that there can be **no transformation of a potentially rich Nigeria to a manifestly rich one**, unless both leaders and followers demonstrate the will to do so.

There can be no development without peace and security. This is our next focus.

D. THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY

Most politicians and analysts now agree that there is a positive link between good governance and the security sector, because unless there is peace and stability, development would be elusive. In Africa, it has been accepted by leaders that there is need for good governance in the security sector in order i) to achieve peace and stability; ii) embark on meaningful development; iii) enable contending armed groups to disarm; and iv) establish a basis for enforcing human rights and restoring dignity.

Security goes beyond military and para-military issues. It involves food, environmental, political, economic and health security, among others. Security issues need to be seen in more holistic terms. If there is no 'good' governance, food and health insecurity could be potent instruments for political instability.

In the past eight years of Nigeria's democracy, there was hardly any serious problem of the armed and security services subjecting themselves to the control of their civilian masters. Yet, the greatest problem has been one of centralizing and controlling the legitimate use of force.

In the context of a weak economy and an ever-enlarging army of the unemployed, violence has become democratized as young men get recruited as political thugs by politicians. In some cases, members of security agencies (serving and retired) arm young men as robbers on highways. More

often than not, the Nigeria Police Force gets overwhelmed by these new challenges and exhibit inability to curb or combat crime. Small arms become accessible to many young people, who use this as weapons of self-sustenance.

1. Security of Life and Property

Since 1999, an atmosphere of insecurity has enveloped the polity. Initially, one thought that the removal of the tight lid under military rule had led to a new sense of freedom transformed into license. Over the last eight years, there have been at least, 140 cases of violence – communal and others. Armed robbery has become part of our normal life. Political and other homicides have become rampant in the system. The assassinations of the late Minister of Justice, Chief Bola Ige, Chief Marshall Harry, the PDP Chairman in Kogi State and Chairman Anambra Bar Association and his wife, gubernatorial aspirants in Lagos and Ekiti, (Eng. Funsho Williams and Chief Daramola respectively), among others, show how life has become really unsafe and short. The entourage of the Governors of Niger, Lagos and Benue were also attacked.

Democracy presupposes responsibility. It presupposes that politicians will be responsible enough to be crisis dampners rather crisis escalators. It also means that government should effectively maintain law and order to encourage the 'rule of law' and prevent the aggrieved from taking laws into his/her hand. Unfortunately, the Nigeria Police Force seems to be overwhelmed, while the constant use of the military for police duties is dangerous for everyone. Government's intimidatory technique of using the Nigeria Police to enable it get away with illegalities is unconstitutional. Government must demonstrate civility, decency and caution in the use of its security services, which are paid from the people's tax funds. They are paid to maintain the system for all and not for a few incumbents in government.

2. The Nigeria Police, Security Agencies and Federalism

The Nigeria Police and other security agencies have earned themselves bad image when it comes to the discharge of its constitutional responsibilities. The level of insecurity and violation of human rights in the country speaks volumes of this image. The failure to perform up to expectation pushed some state governments to establish *vigilante* groups. Beside, the way the police force is used/misused have prompted many to suggest the establishment of State Police Force. In the case of the Anambra saga, the police were found to have acted as the arrowhead for the apparent 'coup' against former Governor Chris Ngige, given the role played by the AIG Ige. It is amazing that while the Inspector-General quickly responded to the order of the Enugu High Court judge, that the security around the Governor be withdrawn, he ignored an Appeal Court order which reversed the order of the lower court, supposedly because the Attorney-General of the Federation had advised against the restoration of the police security for the Governor. The Attorney-General is no interpreter of judgements.

Given the Anambra example in which the President was reported to have ordered the withdrawal of federal police protection from the Governor, the call for the establishment of State police became louder. The impeachment cases in Ekiti, Oyo, Plateau, Anambra and Bayelsa, could easily be carried out because of the centre's control of the police and security agencies. We had argued in the past that the time was not ripe for state police based on our experience of misuse of state or local police. The persistence of brazen misuse of the Nigeria Police by the presidency has however made us to revisit this argument. We now strongly suggest is that the police should be decentralized such that it can operate efficiently in each State. The Governor of the State should be delegated some powers by the President such that within certain limits, he can operate effectively in collaboration with the Commissioner of Police in the State, referring only very serious matters to the President and the Inspector-general of Police. There should be State Police Service operating under given conditions.

Be that as it may, the point is that politicians should not politicize and destroy the credibility of the Nigeria Police. Nor should the police force allow itself to be destroyed. The police is the last hope of the ordinary man in his or her desire for the rule of law. Political leaders must be careful that they do not politicize the police to the extent of committing class suicide.

3. The Vigilantes and Ethnic militias

By May 1999, there were many signs of the resurgence of aggressive subnationalism. After May 1999 there emerged many ethnic militias with different goals. Among these were the *O'dua People's Congress* (OPC), the *Arewa People's Congress* (APC), the *Igbo People's Congress* (IPC), the various *Niger-Delta militias* and the *Bakassi Boys* (BB). A number of economic, political, socio-cultural, and law and order factors led to the emergence of these ethnic militias.³⁹

While OPC was a pan-Yoruba militia devoted to protection of Yoruba culture, identity and independence, the *Ijaw National Youth Movement* in Niger-Delta stood for the protection of Ijaw-land and people. The *Bakassi Boys*, begotten in the throes of the menace of robbery, fraudulent activities, spiritual or ritual killings and other social vices in Abia State, which had defied the ability of the Nigeria police, this group set out to curb or prevent these vices. The state governments of Abia, Anambra, and Imo had used the services of this group at various times, when the police failed.

The emergence of vigilante groups and ethnic militias is a demonstration of the failure of the Nigeria Police and other security agencies. In other cases, as in the Rivers State, politicians were alleged to have armed militias for electoral purposes in 2003. By 2007, these militia groups had become such monsters that the instrument of state violence could hardly control.

One of the greatest problems today is the security of lives and property. This is not unrelated to lack of good governance, which has alienated people from government. The first set of confidence-building measure is to restore mutual confidence between the government and the citizens, as citizens become part of the security collective

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have argued that internal and external factors goaded Nigeria to the adoption of federalism as a technical of managing inter-group conflicts. It is also our contention that federalism will remain a relevant and conducive grid for managing conflicts among Nigerians in the future.

We argued that the challenges of democratic governance are enormous but the determination of leaders and followers committed to the welfare of the people and the development of the state, Nigeria would become truly rich. In addition, we suggested that security is important for peace and development, and respect for human dignity as well as democratic governance.

From the above discussion, it is clear that Nigeria is potentially rich, but not yet manifestly rich. Its wealth must be reflected in the quality of life of its people—shelter, water, infrastructure, level of education, health and skills for individual and societal development. We have not yet arrived at that point of manifest wealth. It therefore cannot be argued that Nigeria is too rich for dignity and the law.

This wrong impression is given by the nature of leadership and followership in Nigeria. It is given by the desperate and greedy actions of leaders and followers with myopic perception of Nigeria's development. Nigeria is not yet rich, and even if it becomes so tomorrow, it would need to respect the dignity of human lives and the rights of individuals and groups. It must respect the rule of law and the autonomy and neutrality of public institutions, if it wants democracy grafted in its political environment. Nigeria must earn its dignity in the comity of nations because it has achieved such domestically. As Nigerians face the challenges of reconciling the governed and the governor, its leaders and citizens must imbibe the human values of **fairness, justice** and **accommodation** in the

democratic process – for these are important in establishing the bedrocks for national dignity and the rule of law.

NOTES

1. See some other literature on federalism: Carl Freiderich, *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice* (London: Pall Mall, 1968); Daniel J. Elazar, *The Politics of American Federalism* (Lexington Mass, -D.C. Heath, 1969); Richard Leach, *American Federalism* (1970); A.B. Akinyemi, P.D. Cole, and W. Ofonagoro (eds) *Readings on Federalism* (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1979); Ronald Watts, *Administration in Federal Systems* (London: Hutchinson Educational, 1970); James Sundquist, *Making Federalism Work* (Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1969) and *Publius: the Journal of Federalism* (Centre for the study of Federalism, Temple University, U.S.A.); Eme Awa, *Issues of Federalism* (Benin: Ethiope Publishers, 1977); Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.) *The U.S. Constitution and Constitutionalism in Africa* (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1989); Dan J. Elazar, *Exploring Federalism* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1987); Vincent Ostrom *The Political Theory of a Compound Republic* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); and D. Elazar, *Governing Peoples and Territories* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982). J. Isawa Elaigwu and E.O. Erim, (eds.) *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: Pre-Colonial Antecedents. Second Edition* (Jos: IGSR, 1996); J. Isawa Elaigwu and G.N. Uzoigwe (eds) *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: 1900-1960* (Jos: IGSR, 2001). J. Isawa Elaigwu and R. Akindele (eds) *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: 1900-1995* (Jos: IGSR, 2001).
2. Shridath Ramphal, The Commonwealth Secretary-General, "Keynote Address to the International Conference on Federalism," at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos. Published in A. B. Akinyemi, P. Cole, and W. Ofonagoro (eds) *Readings on Federalism* (Lagos: N.I.I.A., 1979) pp. xiii-xv.
3. K.C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 10.
4. *ibid.*,
5. Ronald Watts, *op. cit.* p. 5.
6. James Coleman, *Nigeria: A Background to Nationalism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1958), p. 30.
7. Ahmadu Bello, *My Life* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962)
8. See Nnamdi Azikiwe, *Political Blueprint for Nigeria* (Lagos: 1945) for his speeches; in 1975, Zik explained the criteria he used in proposing the creation of units: "When I proposed that Nigeria should become a federation of eight regions in 1943, I was political, and not sociological in my approach. I did not necessarily overlook the tribal factor but, in my innocence, I minimized it" (*Daily Times*, 19 May 1975) p.5.
9. Obafemi Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom* (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), pp. 47-48.
10. Interview with Aminu Kano.
11. Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963) p. 155.
12. *J.S. Mill, Representative Government* (Everyman Edition) pp. 367-368, quoted in Wheare, *Federal Government, op. cit.*, p.51.
13. According to Sklar, on the January 196 coup, "political power had shifted away from the Northern rulers and their allies to a more progressive section of the population. The dangerous imbalance between legal and technological power had been corrected." In other words, the January coup corrected existing imbalance. Richard L. Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective" in R. Melson and H. Wolpe (eds), *Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970) p. 50.

14. Even though Nigeria operated in military system, it was a military federal system of government. The military governments of the regions/states were very powerful and autonomous, especially under the Gowon administration.
15. Henry Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control* (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1974)
16. General Obasanjo was a former Military Head of State (1976 - 78). He came to power as an elected President on May 29, 1999. He has not yet shed his military toga. He is fond of taking actions without sensitivity to due process as required in a democratic polity.
17. *The Vanguard* (Lagos), June 24, 2000, p.6.
18. *ibid.*; *The Vanguard*, May 4, p.2.
19. There were labour crises all over the country. Many state governments could not pay the new wages, thus negotiations with their labour forces failed. In some states, public servants were on strike for between three to six months. See *Vanguard*, May 4, 2000, p.2. in which Governor Dariye of Plateau State expressed his concern— “Our concern is that we don’t want to go back to the ugly past when workers were owed several months arrears of salaries.”
20. It has been suggested that the Structure of the Nigeria Police Force be decentralized in order to allow the zonal commands to be more responsive to local situations. Quite a number of Nigerians are apprehensive of the wanton misuse of the local police by local governments, politicians and traditional leaders, in the past.
21. This is the case of Anambra State where the Bakassi Boys became officially recognized *Vigilante* to complement police efforts. Attempts by the Governor of Lagos to use the OPC have been criticized by the Police, especially since the OPC is a banned organization. See *This Day* (Lagos) August 18, 2000, p.13; August 2, 2000, p.1; July 30, 2000 p.1 and July 27, 2000, p.1.
22. This section (8-3) of the 1999 Constitution States that:
“(3) A bill for a Law of a House of Assembly for the purpose of creating a new local government area shall only be passed if-
(a) a request supported by at least two-thirds majority of members (representing the area demanding the creation of the new local government area) in each of the following, namely-
(i) the House of Assembly in respect of the area, and
(ii) the local government councils in respect of the area, is received by the House of Assembly;
(b) a proposal for the creation of the local government area is thereafter approved in a referendum by at least two-thirds majority of the people of the local government area where the demand for the proposed local government area originated;
(c) the result of the referendum is then approved by a simple majority of the members in each local government council in a majority of all local government councils in the State; and
(d) the result of the referendum is approved by a resolution passed by two-thirds majority of members of the House of Assembly.”
23. *The Vanguard* (Lagos), August 23, 1999, pp.1 and 2.
24. *The Vanguard*, March 9, 2001, p.1.
25. *The Punch*, July 7, 2001, pp.1-2.
26. There are many publications on Nigerian federalism, among which are - Frederich Ebert Foundation, *Constitutions and Federalism: Proceedings of the Conference on Constitutions and Federalism* (Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1997); E. E. O Alemika and Festus Okoye, (ed.), *Constitutional Federalism and Democracy in Nigeria* (Kaduna: Human Rights Monitor, no date); A. Adedeji, *Nigerian Federal Finance* (London: Hutchison Educational, 1969); A. Akanle, *The Power to Tax and Nigerian Federalism* (Lagos: Centre for Business Executives, 1985); E. O. Awa, *Federal Government of Nigeria: A Study of the Development of the Nigeria State*

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Peter P. Ekeh, (ed.) *Nigerian Federalism* (Buffalo: Association of Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue, 1997); *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol.1, No.1 1994 (on Nigeria); J. Isawa Elaigwu and Erim O. Erim, (eds.) *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: Pre-Colonial Antecedents*, Vol.1 (Abuja: National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996); J. Isawa Elaigwu and Godfrey Uzoigwe, (eds.) *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: 1900-1960*, Vol. II (Abuja: National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996); J. Isawa Elaigwu and R. A Akindele, (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: 1960 -1995, Vol. III* (Abuja: National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996); D. Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, (eds.) *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas* (Boulder: Westview, 1983).

27. Federal Government of Nigeria, *The Constitutional Conference Containing the Resolutions and Recommendations*, Vol. II, (Lagos: Government Printer, 1995), p.61.
28. The nearest Nigeria went to a Confederal Constitution was crisis period 1966-67, when the Federal Military Government issued Decree No. 8, 1967, of March 17, 1967, in response to the Aburi peace accord in Ghana.
29. There had been Revenue Commissions in the past— i) Philipson Commission (1946); ii) Hicks-Philipson Commission (1951); iii) Chicks Commission (1953); iv) Raisman Commission (1958); v) Binns Commission (1964); vi) Dina Committee (1969); vii) the Military governments issued decrees in 1967, 1970, 1971 and 1975 on revenue allocation matters; viii) Aboyade Commission (1978),;and ix) Okigbo Commission (1980). The Okigbo Commission formula was amended by subsequent military regimes, as they deemed fit. See T. Y. Danjuma, "Revenue Sharing in Nigerian Federalism" in J. Isawa Elaigwu, P.C. Logams and H. S. Galadima, (eds.) *Federalism and Nation-Building in Nigeria: The Challenges of the 21st Century* (Abuja: National Council On Intergovernmental Relations, 1994), pp. 87-115.
30. These political zones are-

North-Central	North-East	North-West	South-East	South-South	South-West
Benue Kogi Kwara Nasarawa Niger Plateau	Adamawa Bauchi Borno Gombe Taraba Yobe	Jigawa Kaduna Kano Katsina Kebbi Sokoto Zamfara	Abia Anambra Ebonyi Enugu Imo	Akwa-Ibom Bayelsa Cross River Delta Edo Rivers	Ekiti Lagos Ogun Ondo Osun Oyo

31. These states include, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Kano, Yobe, Bauchi, Borno, Kaduna, Jigawa and Katsina.
32. *The Vanguard*, March 27, 2000, p.1.
33. *The Source*, (Lagos) Vol. 6, No.25, April 3, 2000, p.12.
34. *This Day*, (Lagos) August 16, 2000, p.10; *The Vanguard*, September 26, 2001, pp. 31 and 33.
35. *The Nigeria Standard*, (Jos) August 17, 2000, p.7.
36. *The Vanguard*, July 19, 2000, p.2.
37. See J. Isawa Elaigwu "Africa – Crisis and Challenges: Towards a Causal Analysis" in *Governance: A Journal of Institute of Governance and Social Research*, 1:1 April 1998, pp. 31-48.
38. UNDP Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 85.
39. Please see a more detailed analysis in J. Isawa Elaigwu, *Nigeria: Yesterday and Today for Tomorrow*, (Jos: Aha, 2005), pp.132-174.

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23/07 Nigeria: Too Rich for Dignity and the Law?

Perspectives after the 2007 elections

International Conference, June 15 to 17, 2007

In co-operation with Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Church Development Service (EED), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) Nigeria, Heinrich Boell Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, sponsored by Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Berlin

Subject

Nigeria, the demographically largest country with the most extensive oil resources in Africa has become an important power in the region despite its conflict-ridden history. Economic interests dominating the use of resources from outside, large-scale poverty stirring ethnic-religious rivalries about social and political participation, and also disparate structures of government, administration and the security sector have created complex tensions between controversial perspectives of the stakeholders involved.

The ways in which Nigeria will enable itself to deal with the causes of the conflicts make the country an important case of scholarly and political interest far beyond its borders.

Short after the local and federal elections in Nigeria in April 2007, the conference aims at discussing the following issues: How to empower the various segments of the Nigerian population, politically and economically, enhance good governance, fight rampant corruption, conduct appropriate methods of conflict resolution and implement conflict-sensitive codes of conduct for international corporations? How much responsibility, in close cooperation with Nigerian players, for a policy focussed on human security, peace and justice may be assumed by external governmental and non-governmental initiatives?

Our hope is to provide a forum for Nigerian players such as politicians, scholars and analysts along with representatives of civil society to discuss their views with German and international organisations involved in development and conflict resolution. We encourage people with expertise in these fields to share their knowledge and to help identify future areas of cooperation.

Dr. Corinna **Hauswedell**, Director of Studies for International Politics

Program

Friday, June 15, 2007

Welcome and opening of the conference

Dr. Corinna **Hauswedell**, Loccum

Nigeria After the Elections

Introductions to the conference

Prof. Attahiru **Jega**, Präsident, Bayero Universität Kano

Heinrich **Bergstresser**, Journalist, Köln

World Order - Africa - Nigeria

Dr. Denis **Tull**, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

Saturday, June 16, 2007

Representative of the Nigerian Embassy in Germany

Introductions to the Workshops

Federalism, Governance and Security

Prof. Dr. J. Isawa **Elaiwu**, Jos

Responsible Use of Resources

Bunu **Lawan**, Principal Accountant, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Abuja

Ethnic-religious Dimensions of Political Conflicts

Prof. Dr. Klaus **Hock**, University Rostock

Workshop I: Democracy and Security - Issues of Participatory Governance

Chair: Dr. Andreas **Heinemann-Grüder**, BICC, Bonn

Prof. Attahiru **Jega**, Vice Chancellor, Bayero University, Kano

Ibrahim **Biu**, Director Voter Education, Independent National Electoral Commission Headquarters (INEC), Abuja

Heinz **Jockers** / Ralph-Michael **Peters**, Core-Team, European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM), Hamburg

Dr. Etham **Mijah**, Nigerian Defense Academy, Kaduna (to be confirmed)

Olufunmi **Olayinka**, Deputy Governor candidate for Ekiti State, Lagos

Dr. Klaus **Pähler**, Representative to Nigeria, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Abuja

Workshop II: Too Much of Plenty - Too Little to Share?

Issues of Responsible Resource Use and Economic Development

Chair: Kristina **Steenbock**, German Watch, Berlin

Abbia **Udofia**, Chief Legal Officer, Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), Abuja

David **Ugolor**, African Network for Environmental and Economic Justice, Lagos

Dr. Rose **Ngomba**, University of Göttingen, Germany

Dr. Stefan **Cramer**, Director, Heinrich Boell Foundation, Lagos

Dr. Andreas **Dally**, Academy Loccum

Yahaya **Ahmed**, Development Association for Renewable Energies Kaduna, Bonn

Workshop III: Beyond North and South - Ethnic, Religious and Social Dimensions of Conflict

Chair: Dr. Lidwina **Meyer**, Academy Loccum

Ms Hauwa **Ibrahim**, Abuja

Rev. Habila **Istifanus**, General Secretary of ACLA; Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Movement, Jos

Rev. Ike **Okorie**, General Secretary, Christian Council of Churches in Nigeria, Lagos

Fr. Dr. George **Ehusani**, former General Secretary, Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, Lagos

Dr. Nick **Idoko**, Centre for Peace in Africa, Lagos

Future Perspectives I:

How do the different players in Nigeria articulate, position themselves and co-operate on the issues at stake?

Round table feedback from the workshops

Facilitator: Dr. Corinna **Hauswedell**

Sunday, June 17, 2007

Future Perspectives II:

How to address a policy focussed on human security, peace and justice through external initiatives and in close cooperation with Nigerian players?

Panel discussion

Facilitator: Dr. Corinna **Hauswedell**

Dr. Viktor **Matz**, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Berlin

Gabriele **Groneberg**, MP/Social Democratic Party, Berlin

Hartwig **Fischer**, MP/Christian Democratic Union, Berlin

Bunu **Lawan**, ECOWAS

Dapo **Oyewole**, Centre for African Policy & Peace Strategy (CAPPS), London & Lagos