Bosnien und Herzegowina: Ethnonationalismus und Bürgerschaft

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Yugoslav Successor States





Territorial division 2005: "constituent peoples"

Bosnische Bevolkerung (2005)



The Effects of Ethnic Cleansing

1. Comparison of the Population Structure

	Republika Srpska		Federation of BiH	
	1991	1997	1991	1997
Bosniacs	28,77 %	2,19 %	52,09 %	72,61 %
Serbs	54,32	96,79	17,62	2,32
Croats	9,39	1,02	22,13	22,27
Other	7,53	0	8,16	2,38

2. Ethnic origin of judges, public prosecutors and the police in the Republika Srpska

	Serbs	Bosniacs	Croats
Judges and Public Prosecutors	97,6 %	1,6 %	0,8 %
Police	93,7 %	5,3 %	1,0 %

3. Ethnic origin of judges, public prosecutors and the police in the Federation of BiH

	Bosniacs	Croats	Serbs	Other
Judges and Public Prosecutors	71,72 %	23,26 %	5,0 %	No figures
Police	68,81 %	29,89 %	1,22 %	0,08 %









Verfassungsreformansätze 2000 - 2022

• 2002: Reform der Entitätsverfassungen

("imposed" durch HR W. Petritsch)

- 2006: April package (US-led)
- 2006/7: Verfassungsreformverhandlungen (HR Chr. Schwarz-Schilling) oder Polizeireform(EU Institutionen)? SAA unterzeichnet;
- 2009: Butmir negotiations; EGMR, Seijdić and Finci v. BiH;

bis 2021, weitere sechs Fälle (insbesondere 2014: Zornić; 2016: Pilav);

- seit 2011: M. Dodik kündigt dauernd Referendum über Sezession der RS an;
- seit 2016: Forderung nach Reform des Wahlgesetzes durch kroat. HDZ;
- 2020: Mostar Vereinbarung
- 2022: (dir.dem.) Bürgerversammlung: 22 Vorschläge

The Dayton Peace Agreement

• The Dayton-Paris General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995:

International Treaty as **Constitutional system**:

- Annex 3: Elections (OSCE)
- Annex 4: Constitution, and Annexes (CoE; Constitutional Court)
- Annex 6: Human Rights (CoE; Human Rights Chamber)
- Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons (Real Propert Claims Commission)
- Annex 10: Civilian Implementation: OHR + "Bonn Powers" (UN, EU)
- Annex 11: IPTF (UN)

Legalinstitutional Structures of Peace Treaties

- The Dayton "Constitution" (Annex 4):
 - Powersharing/dividing ?
 - -- territorial separation into Entities on the basis of ethnic cleansing;
 - -- de jure and de facto equal representation of "constituent peoples" in the collective Presidency, House of Peoples; and Constitutional Court;
 - -- Mutual veto powers: "VNI"-veto, Entity veto;
 - -- no legal institutionalisation of "constituent peoples": representation through political parties ?

- Coordination/Integration:

- -- Transfer of legislative competences to "state"-level
- -- Establishment of BiH public corporations (Annex 9)
- -- OHR (Annex 10): "Bonn Powers" 1997

Dayton – Status quo

The presumptions of A. Lijphart's model of *"consociational democracy"*:

- Power sharing instead of majority rule will trigger elite co-operation
- This will counter-act desintegrative forces and stabilise the political system
- This will allow for
 - a) functioning state (legislative, executive, judiciary)
 - b) sustainable economic development
 - b) peaceful co-existence of groups

Early Implementation

- The immediate consequences of the war: Ethnic cleansing and ethnic homogenisation of institutions of the Entities;
- Instead of return of refugees and IDPs, ongoing ethnic cleansing;
- No lustration;
- Early parliamentary elections legitimize war-faring political parties; repeated elections: permanent election campaigns based on ethnic mobilisation;

Bosnia and Herzegovina: STATUS QUO



Dayton – Status quo

Against Lijphart's presumptions:

Ethno-territorial delimitation, institutional ethnic key and HR intervention lead to

a *negative* elite consensus to *divide and rule*:

- No incentives for inter-ethnic competition, let alone cooperation
- No incentive for compromise: Institutional mechanisms reward maximalist claims and logic of Either or
- HR intervention allows ethno-nationalist parties to present themselves as staunch defenders of national interests against "foreign imposition" of "foreign solutions"

Constitutional Reform 2006 - 2022

Is there an *alternative* to Dayton/corporate powersharing?

- The "civic" state without ethnic keys:
 - "neutral" state institutions?
 - majority rule?
 - individual human rights only?
- A "strong, federal state" with "important" legislative

competences at State level, but alleviated by regionalisation/federalisation

and local self-government to satisfy ethnic communities demands, but without corporative powersharing mechanisms;

- A multi-national confederation based on the alleged "sovereignty of constituent peoples", ethnically homogenous territories and a right to secession



Constitutional Choices

From multi-national via pluri-ethnic to multicultural political systems ?

Instead of *territorial separation* and *institutional segregation* along ethnic lines:

- De-coupling of territory and cultural identity: from multi-national federalism to *multicultural regionalism* and *transfrontier cooperation*;
- interethnic co-operation in the representative system through **representation** and **participation** without absolute veto-power, but effective participation for national minorities;
- supporting the establishment of *cross-cutting intermediary interest organisations* (trade unions; employers' organisations; teachers' unions; bar associations);
- desegregation of public and private media and the public educational system;
- transitional justice and reconciliation

Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit!

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